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Introduction. 
 
Many times governments and policy makers have to choose among different projects or 
policies to implement.  In principle, the best choice is the one which maximizes the 
social welfare that, in turn, depends on individual preferences. But very often 
preferences are unknown and even not observable.  
 
In practice, a common procedure is to directly ask a sample of individuals about their 
preferences, which are therefore stated by agents rather than revealed by their behaviour. 
Methods for preference revelation can be classified into two broad families.  
 
The first one involves the case in which respondents are asked to simulate their market 
behaviour in a fictitious context designed by the researcher. The final goal of these 
studies is the estimation of willingness to pay (WTP), or willingness to accept (WTA), 
for changes in provision of non-market goods. A large literature investigates both 
theoretical issues connected with these procedures (Bates, 1988) and empirical results 
from country experiences (Mackie at al., 2003). 
 
The second family of surveys are commonly employed in public opinion analysis. In 
this case respondents are asked to reveal their current attitudes, whilst in some 
circumstances they are required to state their satisfaction with a certain policy or service. 
In the last decades the interest towards such analysis largely increased and a broad 
amount of surveys have been systematically collected (Rabin, 2002).   
 
Whatever the kind of analysis, when individuals correctly report the behaviour they 
would keep in a real context, or honestly admit their attitudes and perceptions, the target 
of the policy maker is reached. Hence, the issue of reliability of stated preferences 
becomes crucial in order to understand what we can learn from surveys and how SP 
analysis can be exploited by policy makers. 
 
Our research question is simply the following one: can we trust in SP methods? 
In order to answer this question the work is organised in three sections. 
 
The first one is devoted to the definition of the concept of “reliability”. In the first place, 
the latter depends on the family of SP methods we are dealing with.  
 
When individuals are required to replicate their market behaviour in a fictitious scenario, 
two perspectives can be applied: the first one based on mainstream economic theory 
(Hicks and Allen, 1934) and the other one in accordance to the so called behavioural 
programme (Sunstein and Thaler, 2008). Both approaches are discussed, pointing out 
the problematic issues which characterise each methodology and trying to propose a 
definition for the concept of reliability.  
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The second family of surveys can be classified into two sub-groups, based on the object 
of the analysis. The first group includes all situations where agents are required to 
reveal their actual behaviour (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001) while the second one is 
composed by those studies in which agents are asked to express their feelings or 
perceptions about a certain aspect of their life (McFadden et al. 2005). Again, the 
concept of reliability has been investigated for each group of surveys. 
 
The second and the third sections are devoted to empirical works which try, recalling 
the definition of reliability suggested in the first chapter, to apply this concept to 
empirical studies. 
 
In the second chapter the results of a survey about WTP for travel time are presented. 
This SP study has been specifically carried out for this work and includes 407 
interviews conducted on the regional train between Turin and Milan in June and July 
2008. The design of the questionnaire is shaped based on other surveys focused on a 
similar environment (TRT, 2001).  
 
The issue of reliability in WTP estimations has been discussed by a few studies 
(Salelensminde, 2002), which were based on a different definition of reliability with 
respect to the one proposed in this work. Results show how a significant share of  
respondents (about 25 per cent) finds difficult to properly report their market behaviour 
and suggest that these troubles are connected with agents’ age and with the reason of the 
trip (work or leisure). The econometric analysis is conducted through a multinomial 
logit model in the first part, devoted to the evaluation of the value of ravel time. In the 
second part, the analysis of the relation between “unreliable” statements and individual 
characteristics has been performed using both an ordered logistic regression and a 
Bayesian network, comparing the results of the two methods.  
 
The third section makes use of the results of three Eurobarometer surveys, carried out in 
2000, 2002 and 2004 in fifteen European countries in order to investigate consumers’ 
satisfaction with price and quality of the services. Again, according to the definition 
provided in the first chapter, the issue of reliability has been analysed following 
previous literature on this subject (Fiorio and  Florio, 2008).  
 
The econometric model applied to this section is a generalised ordinal logistic 
regression (Williams, 2007). Results are consistent with previous literature findings and 
suggest how surveys should be cautiously interpreted in order to obtain meaningful 
information. 
Finally, the last part of the third section presents a replication of the exercise applied to 
the survey presented in the second chapter. Even if the first goal of that survey consisted 
in the analysis of travellers’ preferences about time, we asked the respondents to state, 
on a scale from 1 to 10 their satisfaction with railway transport in terms of punctuality. 
The results of this last experiment seem to suggest how satisfaction depends, rather than 
on individual characteristics such as age or education, on travellers’ attitudes and habits.
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1. Introduction. 
Many times governments and policy makers have to choose among different projects or 
policies to implement. The best choice is the one which maximizes the social welfare 
that, in turn, depends on individual preferences. But very often preferences are unknown 
and even not observable.  
 
A common procedure is to directly ask a sample of individuals about their preferences, 
which are therefore stated by agents rather than revealed by their behaviour. When 
individuals exactly report, in the SP exercise, the behaviour they would keep in a real 
context, the target of the policy maker is reached. Unfortunately, no evidence is 
available to discern whether or not SP and RP coincide. Then, the fundamental issue 
becomes the following: can we trust in SP surveys? 
 
In order to answer this question as a first step we have to define the concept of 
reliability. The latter depends on the structure and purpose of our SP study. Two big 
families of surveys can be identified. The first one involves the case in which 
respondents are asked to simulate their market behaviour in a fictitious context designed 
by the researcher, whilst in the second category individuals have to report their attitudes 
or feelings about a certain aspect of their life. 
 
The first group of surveys are widely used in order to estimate willingness to pay 
(WTP), or willingness to accept (WTA), for changes in provision of non-market goods. 
In this context the reliability of our results depends on the assumptions underlying 
consumers’ behaviour. On the one hand, according to ordinal utility theory (Hicks and 
Allen, 1934) we can assume individuals to be perfectly able to choose the option they 
prefer. More recently, however, the so called behavioural programme pointed out that 
very often consumers fail to maximise their utility due to bounded rationality, 
asymmetric information, etc. As a consequence, based on our hypothesis about 
consumers’ behaviour we can, ex-ante, guess how respondents are supposed to properly 
state their preferences and, ex post, check whether their statements are consistent with 
our assumptions.  
 
Surveys of the second kind are commonly employed in public opinion analysis. In this 
case, a further distinction concerns the object of the study. Sometimes respondents are 
asked to reveal their current attitudes, for example how many hours they spend 
watching TV in a day, whilst in some circumstances they are required to state their 
satisfaction with a certain policy or service. Again, the concept of reliability can be 
defined based on this classification. 
The discussion is organised as schematized in this brief introduction. 
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2. The evaluation of WTP and WTA. 
A first family of SP methods is the one used in the estimation of WTP (or WTA) for 
changes in the provision of non-market goods. This category can be split into two 
separate subgroups: Contingent Valuation (CV) methods and Choice Modelling (CM). 
CV is a stated preference method where respondents are asked about their maximum 
WTP for a predetermined increase or decrease in the consumption of a certain good.  
The CM approach prefigures the design of a series of choice sets, each one containing 
usually two or more alternative scenarios. A scenario is a combination of several 
attributes, which are supposed to be relevant in determining individual choices; from 
each choice sets, respondents are asked to select the alternative they prefer. CM analysis 
can take different forms, based on the technique chosen, as summarised in table 1 
(OECD, 2006). 
 
Whatever the design of the questionnaire, the final goal of these studies consists in 
obtaining a perfect substitute for the unobserved RP. Hence, the optimal result is the 
one where the preferences stated by the respondents coincide with the behaviour they 
would follow if the hypothetical alternatives were true. Since real preferences are 
unknown, it is not possible to infer the quality of the analysis through a comparison 
between RP and SP. 
 
Table 1. SP methods. 
 
Method Description 
Contingent valuation 
Respondents are directly asked about their 
monetary evaluations for a hypothetical 
scenario 
Choice modelling:  
Choice experiments Choose between two or more alternatives 
Contingent ranking Rank a series of alternatives 
Contingent rating Score alternatives on a scale of values 
Paired comparisons Score paired of scenarios on similar scale 
 
However, economic theory provides some assumptions about consumers’ choices. 
Moreover, it suggests how agents will behave when they are asked to state their 
preferences. For example, they could have incentives to misreport their behaviour.  
Then, based on our theory, we can summarise ex ante all the sources of bias we expect 
will affect the SP study and all the assumptions about preferences which are supposed 
to hold. As a second step we can check, ex post, whether SP results are consistent with 
our ex ante hypothesis or not. If it is not the case and if we believe in our prior 
assumptions, inconsistent choices are not a good substitute for RP. 
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The possibility to check SP results is constrained by the design of the questionnaire 
(Foster and Mourato, 2002), whilst the theoretical assumptions depend on the approach 
we decide to follow. Mainstream economics, i.e. ordinal utility theory (Hicks and Allen, 
1934), assume individuals to be rational and preferences to be consistent with this 
hypothesis. However, the so called behavioural programme (Thaler, 1988) rejects this 
assumption, showing that in many cases agents do not act in accordance with the 
paradigm ordinal utility theory.  
 
2.1. SP reliability and ordinal utility theory. 
In “A reconsideration of the theory of value” (1934) Hicks and Allen revised Alfred 
Marshall’s theory of consumer behaviour on ordinalist lines, following Pareto 
demonstration of the immeasurability of utility (Pareto, 1909). 
 
Some years after their contribution, Samuelson developed a new approach to 
consumers’ behaviour, in an attempt to formulate a new economic theory, which may 
achieve the main results of ordinal utility theory, but being entirely based on observable 
phenomena and free from all unnecessarily restrictive conditions (such as, for example, 
the law of diminishing marginal rate of substitution, DMRS), dropping off, using 
Samuelson’s words, last vestiges of the utility analysis. In his 1938’s article, Samuelson 
gave the first description of the concept which ten years later, in 1948, he called 
“revealed preference” and formulated the postulate well-known as the Weak Axiom of 
Revealed Preferences (WARP). 
 
Both ordinal utility theory and Samuelson’s approach need some assumptions about the 
structure of preferences and the choice situation, in order to be able to derive 
preferences from observed behaviour. 
 
Some properties regard the nature of consumers’ preferences (Mas-Colell and Green, 
1995). Let , ,x y z be consumption bundles in the consumption set LX +∈R . Then, 
consumer’s preferences are defined as rational when they respect the assumption of: 
a. completeness: for all ,x y X∈ we have that x y%  or y x% (or both); 
b. transitivity: for all , ,x y z X∈ , if x y% and y z% then x z% ; 
c. asymmetry: if x yf  it cannot hold the opposite, y xf ; 
d. non-satiation: for every x X∈ and every ε > 0 , there is y X∈ such that 
y x ε− < and y xf ; 
e. strict convexity: for every x , if y x% , z x%  and  y z≠ implies 
(1 )y z xα α+ − f for all (0,1)α∈ . 
Assumptions about individual preferences define the so called homo economicus, i.e. 
the abstraction used as a general model of motivation for economic agents.  
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In addiction to the previous five assumptions we need other hypotheses about the choice 
situation: 
f. each good is perfectly divisible; 
g. it is possible for a consumer to buy any combination of good he can afford; 
h. consumers act as price-takers; 
i. the price per unit of each good is the same regardless of the quantities purchased. 
 
According to this theory individuals are always able to choose the market option they 
prefer. As a consequence, what could we expect from a SP analysis about individual 
preferences? As we said, the final goal of the researcher consists in possibly obtaining a 
perfect substitute of RP. Relative to the latter, SP methods can be biased by two factors: 
1. individuals could falsify their own preferences in a way they find somehow 
beneficial; 
2. choices may not respect the assumptions a-e listed above, as pointed out by 
several authors (Saelensminde, 2002). 
 
Case 1: unfair statements. As we said, individuals may find convenient to misreport 
their choices. Economic theory provides some expectations about rational respondents’ 
behaviour when they are asked to reveal their preferences. 
 
In order to reach a Pareto-optimal provision for a public good, Samuelson Rule 
(Samuelson, 1954) requires that the total marginal benefit of the provision of another 
unit of the public good must equal the marginal cost of this extra unit. Since the total 
benefits are defined as the sum of individual ones, the policy-maker should observe the 
demand function of each individual.  
 
The Lindhal equilibrium (Lindhal, 1958) provides a tax scheme which allows to reach a 
Pareto-efficient equilibrium through personalised payments based on individuals’ 
marginal benefits. However, in many practical situations such mechanism fails when 
consumers are asked to reveal their true demands and may gain by making false 
statements of their preferences. The problem of preference revelation led to the 
definition of new mechanisms which make unprofitable any attempt of falsification.  
 
The Clarke-Groves Mechanism (Clarke, 1971, Groves and Loeb, 1975) presents a 
contribution scheme for which truth telling is a dominant strategy. Basically, according 
to the model formalised by Groves, individuals are required to reveal the net benefits 
they get from the provision of a public good. The latter is provided only if total net 
benefits are positive. Then, each agent is subject to a transfer which is equal to the 
reported net benefits of other individuals. These side payments induce agents to tell the 
truth, since misreporting their preferences does not lead anymore to a gain in utility. 
The Clarke Mechanism works similarly; the main difference concerns the transfer, 
which is applied only to pivotal agents, whose benefits change the social decision about 
the provision of the public good. Hence, compared with the Groves Mechanism the 
Clarke scheme lowers the cost of information revelation. 
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These mechanisms involve many practical problems (Rothkopf, 2007). In SP surveys, 
for instance, individuals are not subject to any form of transfer or side payment and 
their statements are at the mercy of dishonest incentives. In such a context the role of SP 
methods needs further investigation: if respondents are supposed to misreport their 
preferences, what is the benefit of asking them? 
 
Another approach (Crawford and Sobel, 1981) concerns informative lobbying. 
According to these models a lobbyist may have superior information about the policy 
environment than the policy-maker. By transmitting this information to the policy-
maker he could positively contribute to the economy. 
More formally, consider a model characterised by only two possible states of the world, 
lθ  and hθ , where lθ < hθ . At the time the policy has to be chosen, the policy-maker is 
uncertain about the economic environment (θ ). Each state of the world requires a 
different policy choice, respectively lπ and hπ  if lθ  or hθ are verified. Without 
additional information, the policy-maker would base his policy choice upon some prior 
beliefs about the possibility to observe alternative environments. However, if the policy 
is not correct for the state of the world which is realized, the society will incur in a 
welfare loss, according to the objective function: 
2( , ) ( )W π θ π θ= − −  
If the policy-maker is uninformed about the environment and initially regards the two 
states as equally likely he will choose a policy based on the expected state of the world: 
2
e l hθ θπ +=                                                                                                                       (1) 
Suppose the existence of a lobbyist who knows the state of the world. His preferences 
are defined by the function: 
2( , ) ( )U π θ π θ= − − − ∆  
that is, the ideal policy for the lobbyist exceeds the ideal policy of the policy-maker by 
an amount ∆ (extent of disagreement) for either states of the world. 
The lobbyist can only report either lθ or hθ  and if he is trusted by the policy-maker the 
policy chosen will be respectively lπ or hπ . 
If hθ is the true state, the lobbyist does not have any incentive to misreport the 
information. If the state is lθ the lobbyist has a potential incentive to lie because a 
truthful report, if trusted by the policy-maker, would lead to a policy level lπ , below the 
ideal policy of the lobbyist, lπ + ∆  .  
Hence, the lobbyist may prefer to claim that the state is high, obtaining a policy 
hπ rather than lπ , if the extent of disagreement is sufficiently large: 
( ) ( )l l h lθ θ θ θ+ ∆ − ≤ − + ∆  
which reduces to  
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1
( )
2 h l
θ θ∆ ≤ −  
If this inequality is not satisfied, when the state of the world is low the welfare loss will 
be equal to: 
2
1( , ) ( )h lW π θ π θ= − −  
which is worse compared with the case in which the policy-maker decides not to ask the 
lobbyist and sets the policy equal to the expected value of the state of the world. Then, 
asking the lobbyist is not always the best choice, as it could be welfare worsening. 
The information transmission problem in SP surveys can be analysed in a similar 
manner. A certain state of the world (e.g. the shadow price for a non-market good) 
occurs, but the policy-maker is still not able to observe it, while some individuals are 
aware of it. Then, the policy-maker directly asks agents to honestly reveal their superior 
information. In the SP exercise each respondent can be seen as a lobbyist, who 
represents his own interest rather than a certain group of people and still does not share 
the same preferences as the policy-maker.  Moreover, the extent of disagreement differs 
among agents.  
Consider for example an economy characterised by the policy-maker and two 
individuals with symmetric preferences. First agent’s preferences are defined by: 
2
1( , ) ( )U π θ π θ= − − − ∆  
whilst the utility function of the second respondent can be written as: 
2
2 ( , ) ( )U π θ π θ= − − + ∆  
Again, the policy-maker does not know which state occurs between lθ and hθ . Then, he 
can set a policy based on the expected state of the world (1) or directly ask the two 
agents about their preferences and set the policy chosen equal to their mean: 
( ) ii n
θ
π θ =∑  
where the subscript i indicates individuals 1 and 2 (here 2n = ) 
In this case, individuals’ incentive to misreport their preferences is based both on the 
observed state of the world and on the expected statement of the other agent.  
If the economic environment is hθ , the first respondent will always tell the truth, while 
the second one will consider the following options. If he thinks the other individual is 
reporting hθ , he will do the same only if 
1
2 2 2
h h h lθ θ θ θ+ + ∆ ≤ − 
 
  
which reduces to 1 
( )1
4 h l
θ θ∆ ≤ −  
while he will lie, reporting lθ , if ∆> ( )1
4 h l
θ θ− .  
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Similarly, if he assumes the other agent is reporting lθ , he will truthfully state hθ only if 
( )3
4 h l
θ θ∆ ≤ − and he will choose to lie if the latter inequality does not hold.  
If the economic environment is lθ , the same reasoning applies for the second respondent, 
whilst the first one will always give an honest statement. 
Summing up, whichever the state of the world, if the extent of disagreement is 
sufficiently low ( ( )1
4 h l
θ θ∆ ≤ − ) the policy-maker can expect both respondents to tell 
the truth. In this case the welfare loss will be equal to zero. 
 If the extent of disagreement is larger than ( )3
4 h l
θ θ−  the welfare loss will be equal to: 
2
( , )
2
h lW
θ θ
π θ
− = − 
 
 
which is the same result the policy-maker would obtain by setting the policy equal to 
the expected state of the world (1). If ( )1
4 h l
θ θ− < ( )3
4 h l
θ θ∆ ≤ − the size of the welfare 
loss depends on the beliefs of each respondent about the opponent’s choice. When the 
latter is equally likely, i.e. the probability attached to each statement ( lθ and hθ ) is the 
same, the respondent is indifferent between a fair answer and an unfair one. If it is the 
case the expected welfare loss will be equal to zero with probability 1
2
p = and equal 
to
2
2
h lθ θ− − 
 
with probability 1
2
p = . Hence, whatever the state of the world and the size 
of the extent of disagreement, asking the agents cannot lead to a welfare loss lower than 
the one which derives by setting the policy equal to the expected economic environment. 
 
Adding more respondents. Suppose now to add more lobbyists to our economy, keeping 
balanced the number of individuals whose preferences are above and below the state of 
the world. In other words, for each respondent with preferences equal to ( )iθ + ∆ there 
is another agent who would prefer a policy equal to ( )iθ − ∆ . Note that, since the state of 
the world is defined by the mean of individual preferences, also the size of the extents 
of disagreement has to be balanced. 
For instance, consider the case in which the economy is characterised by four 
individuals. Compared with the previous case the incentive to tell the truth reduces, as 
now the decision about the fairness of the statement is based on the behaviour followed 
by all other three agents.  
Following the same reasoning as before, the policy-maker can expect all respondents to 
tell the truth if ( )1
8i h l
θ θ∆ ≤ − . In this case the welfare loss will be equal to zero. On the 
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contrary, if the extent of disagreement is very large ( ( )7
8i h l
θ θ∆ ≥ − ), half of agents 
(those with preferences iθ − ∆ when the true state is hθ  and vice versa) will report the 
false environment, leading to a welfare loss still equal to the one reached by setting the 
policy chosen equal to the expected state of the world (1). 
When the extent of disagreement is comprehended between these two levels, the 
decision about the statement is based on the beliefs each agent attaches to the 
opponents’ choices. If the latter are equally likely, this time the best strategy is to tell 
the truth if ( )3
8i h l
θ θ∆ ≤ −  and to misreport one own preferences if ( )5
8i h l
θ θ∆ ≥ − , 
while between these two boundary levels each agent is indifferent between a fair or 
unfair answer. Again, asking individuals about their preferences leads, in the best case, 
to a welfare improvement and, if the extent of disagreement is very large, to a result 
which equals the one obtained by setting the policy at the environment’s expected value.  
In general, keeping balanced the signs and the size of the extents of disagreement and 
increasing the number of lobbyists, we will expect a truthful statement by the whole 
sample if  
 ( )1
2i h ln
θ θ∆ ≤ −   
whilst half of the sample will report an unfair answer if 
( )(2 1)
2i h l
n
n
θ θ−∆ ≥ −  
If the probability attached by each respondent to the opponents’ statements is the same 
for  lθ  and hθ we will expect all individuals to tell the truth if: 
( )( 1)
2i h l
n
n
θ θ−∆ ≤ −  
while half of the sample will misreport their preference if: 
( )( 1)
2i h l
n
n
θ θ+∆ ≥ −  
Asymmetric preferences. The reasoning reported above holds if we assume preferences 
to be symmetric. In other words, the incentives to lie have to be perfectly balanced 
between individuals. However, this hypothesis sounds unrealistic in many empirical 
scenarios. For example, consider the case where the policy-maker is uncertain about 
whether or not to build a new high-speed railway. His decision is based on travellers’ 
WTP for a reduction in travel time. Then, he decides to ask them about their valuation 
of time. However, in most cases travellers are worried about an increase in fares and 
have an incentive to lower their WTP ( )iθ − ∆ . On the contrary, a minority group of 
wealthy respondents is enthusiastic about the project and their incentive to misreport 
preferences affects the results in the opposite direction ( )iθ + ∆ .  
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Recall the first case and suppose to have three agents instead of two. The first two 
individuals’ preferences are defined by:  
2
1( , ) ( )U π θ π θ= − − + ∆  
whilst the utility function of the third respondent is: 
2
2 ( , ) ( )U π θ π θ= − − − ∆  
Suppose hθ  to be the true state of the world. Then, the third individual will always tell 
the truth, while the others will base their decision on the expected behaviour of the 
opponents.  They will always truthfully reveal their preferences if ( )1
6i h l
θ θ∆ ≤ − . Vice 
versa, they will lie when ( )5
6i h l
θ θ∆ ≥ − . Between these two thresholds their behaviour 
will depend on the beliefs attached to the opponents’ statements. If they do not have any 
particular presumption about them, they will correctly report the state of the world if 
( )1
2i h l
θ θ∆ ≤ −  and they will lie if i∆ > ( )
1
2 h l
θ θ− . 
When lθ is the true environment, the first two agents will always tell the true, whilst the 
third one will behave according to the same incentives depicted for his opponents. 
If we consider the role of the policy-maker, he can set the policy chosen to the expected 
value of the state of the world (1) or decide to ask the individuals about their 
preferences. If the true state is lθ the welfare loss will be at most equal to  
2
( , )
3
h l
lW
θ θ
π θ
− = − 
 
 
which is better compared with the welfare loss which derives by setting the policy 
according to (1): 
2
1( , ) 2
h lW
θ θ
π θ
− = − 
 
 
However, if the true state of the world is hθ , asking the individuals could lead to a 
welfare worsening, since if first two agents’ extent of disagreement is large enough the 
loss will be equal to 
 ( )22( , )
3h l h
W π θ θ θ= − −  
instead of  
( )21
1
( , )
2 l h
W π θ θ θ= − −  
Compared with the case characterised by symmetric preferences, this time the profit 
from asking individuals depends on the size of the extent of disagreements. Compared 
to the results from previous literature on this topic (Hindricks and Myles, 2006), the 
presence of more than one informed agent does not necessarily help the policy-maker in 
determining the best policy to implement. 
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As we have seen, economic theory suggests that, without any monetary mechanism 
attached to the process of revelation of preferences, dominant truth-revealing strategies 
do not hold. Agents’ statements could be affected by incentives to misreport true 
preferences. This source of bias would distort SP results compared with unobserved RP.  
However, in some cases the policy-maker finds convenient to ask agents about their 
preferences because, by doing so, the expected welfare loss is not lower than the one he 
would obtain by setting the policy chosen at random. 
Whatever the case, if individuals lie according to assumptions a-e listed above, the 
researcher will not be able to distinguish between fair and unfair statements.  
 
Case 2: inconsistent choices. Some authors (Foster and Mourato, 2002) pointed out how, 
in many SP studies, a significant share of answers is not consistent with the predictions 
of economic theory. Hence, they suggest to reduce the sample through the exclusion of 
all illogical answers. Since the evidence shows that the inclusion or the exclusion of test 
failures has a significant effect on WTP estimations, the problem is relevant. 
 
The possibility to test theoretical assumptions is constrained by the structure of the SP 
study. Forster and Mourato (2002) apply their reasoning to a contingent ranking 
experiment (see table 1). Salesminde (2002) verifies logical consistency by using a 
choice experiment survey. 
 
Then, reliability of SP results can be checked only based on the hypotheses which 
define the homo-economics portrait. According to this approach, reliability is defined in 
terms of logical consistency to assumptions a-e summarised above.  
 
2.2. SP reliability and the behavioural economics programme. 
A branch of economic analysis, the so called behavioural programme, investigates what 
happens in markets in which some of agents display human limitations and 
complications (Mullainathan and Thaler 2000).  
 
According to this approach (Kahneman, 1997), two core meanings of utility can be 
distinguished. Decision utility is inferred from choices and used to explain them. It 
equates happiness with choices per se, since utility is defined in terms of choice itself. 
Under this approach (Kahneman and Thaler 2005) what matters is the question of 
whether preferences are consistent with each other and with the axioms of rational 
choice, such as those listed above.  Experienced utility, in contrast, is hedonic quality, as 
in Bentham’s usage. It is based on desires, as it equates happiness with desire fulfilment. 
According to Bentham (1789), by the principle of utility is meant that principle which 
approves (…) of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to 
have to augment (…) the happiness of the party whose interest is in question. 
 
Relative to the ordinal utility theory, two new terms are introduced: desire and 
happiness. The former is the sole element which drives human’s behaviour, while the 
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latter constitutes the target of every human’s act. Since both concepts are non 
observational, if we want to rationalize individuals’ behaviour we have to refer to some 
observable substitutes. Ordinal utility theory operated this substitution by letting 
coincide desires with choices and happiness with utility. Moreover, it is assumed that 
consumers’ preferences can be rationalized according to some rules (assumptions a-e 
above) and that agents never fail to choose the market option which maximizes their 
utility. The behavioural economics programme criticized the decision utility approach 
since, by divorcing utility from desire altogether, it merely becomes a theory (…), of the 
numerical representability of choice (Sen, 1981). The criticism is based on two 
fundamental issues. 
 
First of all, choices and utility do not always work well as substitutes for desires and 
happiness. If choice sets and utility levels are defined on the base of observable entities 
such as prices and quantities, many times the concepts of desire and happiness involve 
other, non observational ingredients such as moral and ethical issues. For this reason, 
consumers’ behaviour cannot be rationalized based on those assumptions which 
characterize the homo economicus abstraction. Observed market behaviour shows how 
people do not always choose according to those rules they are supposed to follow, at 
least for those cases in which the maximisation of their utility does not coincide with the 
maximisation of their desires. 
 
Consider the following example, extracted from the large literature existing on this 
subject (Bowles, 2004). In an ultimatum game two players have to split 100 $. The first 
player makes a proposal to the second one, who can accept or turn it down. Consider 
now a subject who rejects an offer of splitting 100 $ by (92$; 8$), after realizing that the 
first player could have proposed a more equitable partition. Choices of this kind are 
often observed (Rabin 2002), even if they are not consistent with predictions of 
economic theory and in particular with the assumption of non satiation (assumption d 
reported above). A preference for the allocation (0$; 0$), rather than for a more 
profitable one as (92$; 8$) looks irrational under a neoclassical point of view but fully 
motivated from a human perspective.  
Another example, concerning again departures from the self interest assumption, is the 
following. Player 1 is asked to choose between two different allocations for two other 
individuals.  
 
 
Table 2. 
 
Player 1 chooses 
 Money for Player 2 Money for Player 3 Approximate findings 
Option 1 7.50 $ 3.50 $ 50% 
Option 2 4.00 $ 4.00 $ 50% 
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Empirical evidence, reported above in table 2 (Robin and Charmess 2000), shows how 
half of the respondents prefers the solution that maximizes the total outcome (option 1), 
while the others are more concerned about the situation of the poorest individual. 
Now let change the rule of the game: it is Player 3 who has to choose between the two 
allocations. Results, reported in table 3, are quite similar compared with the previous 
case excepted for a slightly stronger preference for the second option, which is more 
advantageous for Player 3 himself.  
 
 
Table 3. 
 
Player 3 chooses 
 Money for Player 2 Money for Player 3 Approximate findings 
Option 1 7.50 $ 3.50$ 40% 
Option 2 4.00 $ 4.00 $ 60% 
 
Suppose now that, again, Player 3 has to choose as in the previous case but, this time, he 
chooses after that Player 2 has created this scenario by rejecting a third alternative 
(5.50$; 5.50$). The decision of Player 2 to remove the latter allocation in favour of 
trying to get Player 3 to choose the first option is an unfair behaviour, as it involves a 
small increase in total surplus while leading to an unequal distribution of money. 
 
Table 4. 
Player 3 chooses 
after Player 2 
rejected (5,50; 5,50) 
 Money for Player 2 Money for Player 3 Approximate findings 
Option 1 7.50 $ 3.50$ 10% 
Option 2 4.00 $ 4.00 $ 90% 
 
This time (table 4) Player 3 chooses quite differently: the strong majority of respondents 
are not willing to sacrifice 0.50 $ in favour of a better allocation for Player 2. It has to 
be noted how, in the last two cases, Player 3 was facing the same problem. Even if the 
alternatives were identical, his choice changed in response of previous behaviour of 
other players. In this case the assumption of symmetry (c in the list above) does not hold: 
some individuals who preferred option 1 over option 2 in the second exercise inverted 
their preferences in the last experiment.  
   
Another objection moved to the traditional framework regards the evidence that people 
care a lot about changes, and not only in absolute level of consumption, wealth or 
whatever. For example, the event of becoming wealthy, not only being wealthy, can 
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often be a major source of satisfaction. Rabin (2002) notes that a crucial role in 
explaining preferences is played by loss aversion, since individuals often value losses 
much more than commensurate gains. The so called endowment effect represents, 
according to Knetsch, Tang and Thaler (1998) one of the most robust findings of the 
psychology of decision making 2 . The utility which derives from the current 
consumption not only depends on its level but also on how that level compares to what 
we are used to. Camerer (1995) suggests how reference-dependence can be thought of 
simply in terms of a new assumption about preferences: letting c  be a vector of the 
levels of, let’s say, consumption of goods, and r  be a vector of reference levels in the 
same dimension, incorporating reference dependence into the utility theory involves 
merely a switch from ( )U c  to ( , )U c r .  
 
At last, a prediction of economic theory that is frequently rejected by experimental 
evidence concerns preferences over time. Individuals prefer to experience pleasant 
things soon and to delay unpleasant things until later. As pointed out by Rabin (2002) 
economists traditionally model such tastes by assuming that people discount streams of 
utility over time exponentially. But this functional form generates time consistent 
preferences, i.e. the reference between any two intertemporal tradeoffs in monetary 
well-being is the same no matter when asked. Behavioural evidence shows, in contrast, 
how people exhibit present-biased preferences: they are more averse to delaying 
today’s gratification until tomorrow than they are averse to delaying the same 
gratification from 90 days to 91 days from now Rabin (2002). Many psychological 
experiments support present-biased preferences and some researchers (Gollier 2003) 
tried to model such preferences through alternative discount functions.   
 
We have presented three cases in which choices do not respect traditional assumptions 
of economic theory even if they cannot said to be irrational: people’ preferences are not 
always driven by self interest, agents care not just about final outcomes but also how 
they arrived there and how their situation changed, their preference are present-biased. 
The violations are due to the incompleteness of our hypothesis, which fail to consider 
all the elements that do matter in consumers’ behaviour. 
 
The second criticism moved to mainstream economics concerns the cases in which 
agents fail to choose the market option which maximizes their utility (or their happiness) 
because of bounded rationality. As Thaler (1988) refers, in the traditional framework 
economic agents are supposed to be able to make accurate, or at least unbiased forecasts 
of the hedonic outcomes of potential choices. Systematic errors in utility forecasting 
have been detected in several cases. A good example is provided by Nisbett and 
Kanouse (1968) about hungry shoppers: they showed that shoppers who are hungry tend 
to buy food as they expected to remain permanently famished, but shoppers who are 
given something to eat before entering the supermarket are more likely to restrict their 
shopping to the items on their list (Gilbert, Gill and Wilson, 1998). As pointed out by 
Kahneman and Thaler (2005), if the current state of hunger induces the shopper to buy 
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an overly large dinner portion for consumption later in the week, then he has made a 
forecasting error which has lead to a bad choice.  
 
Kahneman (2003) provides a detailed literature review about bounded rationality. 
Basically, two generic modes of thinking and deciding are identified. The first one 
(System 1) refers to what is usually defined as “intuition”, while the second one 
(System 2) corresponds to the everyday concept of “reasoning”. If the operations of 
System 1 are fast, automatic, effortless, associative and often emotionally charged (…) 
System 2 is slower, serial, effortful and deliberately controlled (Kahneman, 2003). 
When asked to take decisions or to express a judgement, individuals base their 
behaviour on both impressions and tendencies generated by System 1 and on the 
monitoring and corrective functions of System 2. The performance connected with each 
system is affected by several factors. As reported by Kahneman, the ability to avoid 
errors of intuitive judgement is impaired by time pressure, by concurrent involvement in 
a different cognitive task, by performing the task in the evening for “morning people” 
and vice versa, by being in a good mood. The facility of System 2 is positively 
correlated with intelligence, with the so called “need for cognition” (a psychological 
finding which characterise those people who find thinking fun) and with exposure to 
statistical thinking. 
 
The behavioural programme provided empirical demonstration of some weakness of 
ordinal utility theory. Assumptions a-e listed above are not always verified and then, 
according to the behavioural approach, they cannot be used to discriminate between 
reliable and unreliable behaviours. Hence, keeping in mind that the final goal of the SP 
methods consists in obtaining a perfect substitute for real and unobserved preferences, 
which sources of bias could we expect to have an influence on our results? 
Again, SP methods can be biased by two factors: 
1. individuals could falsify their own preferences in a way they find somehow 
beneficial; 
2. agents may fail to report the preferred option due to bounded rationality.  
 
Case 1: unfair statements. As in the previous case, individuals could still have an 
incentive to influence the policy chosen by the policy-maker. However, from a 
behavioural perspective it is not clear how misreported preferences will affect social 
welfare. Individuals’ choices cannot be rationalised as in the previous paragraph: rather 
then basing their statements on opponents’ expected behaviour, agents decide to lie on 
the ground of a mixture of moral sentiments and biased (or unbiased) beliefs. For 
instance, Bonsall (1985) refers to justification bias for those cases in which individuals 
deliberately give biased choices simply because they want to look in a better light with 
the interviewer. Whatever the purpose of the unfair statements, it is still not possible to 
discern, ex-post, between fair and unfair statements. 
 
Case 2: unintentional misreported preferences. In some situations individuals may fail 
to correctly report their preferences even without being motivated by dishonest intents. 
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Here statements’ accuracy cannot be interpreted anymore in terms of logical 
consistency with respect to assumptions a-e. The first group of objections moved to 
mainstream economics showed how the homo-economicus abstraction fails to keep into 
account elements which do matter in the definition of individual utility patterns.  
In the SP exercise agents are asked to choose, rank or score different market options, 
each one characterised by a certain level of the relevant attributes. Then, answering the 
survey implies a mental effort, and the intensity of this effort is related to both survey’s 
design and individual skills.  
 
Many studies demonstrate how survey’s design affects agents’ statements. Intuitively, 
the greater the number of alternative scenarios, the more intense the cognitive effort. 
Boredom effects and response fatigue have been confirmed by some researchers 
(McFadden, 1986). Often agents try to minimize their mental strain by following rules 
of thumb or anchoring to earlier tasks (Bates, 1988). The problem can be analysed 
recalling the classification suggested by Kahneman (2003). When asked to choose 
between two alternative scenarios or to rank some market options, agents deal with a 
logical problem and they use System 2 in order to understand the rules of the game and 
to think about their answer. However, if the choice problem is reiterated (the 
interviewee is asked to choose between a sequence of couples of alternative options) the 
respondent is likely to base his statements on rules of thumb rather than on effortful 
reasonings. For instance, he could take as reference a certain level of an attribute and 
accept (or refuse) all the options characterised by a higher (lower) quantity of that 
particular attribute. In other words, agents shift from System 2 to System 1 since they 
want to reduce the fatigue connected to the SP exercise. In this way they may fail to 
choose the preferred option because they do not pay sufficiently attention to the 
alternative options. 
 
Independently of survey’s design, also individual skills affect agents’ capability to 
correctly report their preferences. As noticed by Kahneman (2003) individuals who are 
used to deal with logical problems are more likely to properly solve the SP exercise.  
Individuals characterised by high logical skills are also more likely to elaborate efficient 
rules of thumb.  
 
Compared with the case presented in the previous paragraph, the behavioural 
programme does not provide a set of assumptions about consumers’ behaviour. Hence, 
it is not clear how the consistency of SP results can be checked and in which cases they 
should be rejected from the survey. The next section is devoted to further discussion 
about this issue.  
 
2.3. SP reliability: discussion. 
We analysed as a first category of SP those analysis in which agents are asked to choose 
among different and alternative scenarios, where each option is characterised by 
different levels of some attributes of interest for the policy maker. As in a market-choice 
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situation, individuals evaluate and compare the alternatives and choose the preferred 
one. In general, the closer the SP are to the unobserved RP, the better is the quality of 
our survey and, consequently, the more reliable its results are. Since, as we said, RP are 
not observable, in principle it is impossible to discriminate between reliable and 
unreliable stated preferences. The only possible way of proceeding is to make some 
assumptions about RP and to exclude from the surveys all those statements which are 
not consistent with our hypothesis. 
 
In the previous sections we described two different approaches to the same problem: the 
first one based on mainstream economic theory and the other one in accordance with the 
behavioural economics programme. These methods provide different sets of 
assumptions about consumers’ behaviour. On the ground of these hypotheses SP results 
can be checked for logical consistency (LC). However, this procedure presents some 
problematic aspects which concern both approaches. 
 
Firstly, consider the mainstream economics viewpoint.  
Some authors (Foster and Mourato, 2002) showed how, in many SP analyses, some 
agents fail to report consistent preferences compared to the predictions of economic 
theory. Then, following this approach we are adopting a decision utility perspective: all 
those choices which are logical consistent with our axioms are reliable, the others are 
not. On the one hand this method sounds correct. Through SP analysis we are, by 
definition, trying to derive preferences from observed (in this case stated) choices. 
Researchers use statements in order to estimate a utility function whose elements are the 
attributes included in the SP exercise. As this is nothing but a decision utility approach, 
there is no reason for which we should not analyse the results of such a study from the 
same perspective. 
 
On the other hand this procedure seems somehow contradictory. Since consumer theory 
is supposed to explain consumer’s behaviour, why should we observe cases which 
violate our theoretical assumptions? Moreover, if we observe such inconsistent 
preferences and we decide to exclude them from the sample, we are admitting that some 
agents behaved irrationally, which turns out to be a rejection of our theory. 
 
One could object that some respondents are not interested in answering the survey. 
When asked to give their contribution to the SP exercise they are facing two costs. The 
first one ( 1c ) is the cost of answering the questionnaire, which depends on the mental 
efforts and on the revelation of private information. The second one ( 2c ) is the cost for 
refusing to participate to the SP exercise, and it is connected to the bad impression the 
respondent would make with the interviewer if he refuses to help him. If 1c and 2c are 
sufficiently high, the best strategy for the respondent is to participate to the survey by 
giving answers at random, in order to minimise the mental effort and please the 
interviewer. Then, with a certain probability he will not pass the LC test but, in a real 
context, he would act according to assumptions a-e listed in the previous section. 
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Following this reasoning the attention shifts from the reliability of preferences to the 
validity of our hypothesis: if the latter holds, then a certain set of properties can be used 
as an instrument of detection of unacceptable preferences. 
 
In a sense, ordinal utility theory can be viewed as a sort of progenitor of the behavioural 
programme. According to Hicks and Allen (1934), who revised Alfred Marshall’s 
theory of consumer behaviour on ordinal lines, all concepts must correspond to 
observational phenomena, as Pareto provided a positive demonstration that the facts of 
observable conduct make a scale of preferences capable of theoretical construction (…) 
but they do not enable us to proceed from the scale of preference to a particular utility 
function. The first victim of this reasoning is the concept of cardinal utility, and the rule 
which drives consumers’ choices becomes the principle of Diminishing Marginal Rate 
of Substitution (DMRS). The latter, that allows indifference curves to be convex to the 
axes and, consequently, enables the equilibrium to be stable, is not a mere translation; it 
is a positive change in the foundation of the theory, and requires a very definite 
justification (Hicks 1939, p. 21). A first justification is based on empirical evidence. 
People buy some quantities of commodities and reject other market options, then it 
follows that the principle of DMRS must sometimes be true. Hicks recognizes that this 
explanation cannot give general validity to the new theory and therefore tries to suggest 
a more persuasive argument. He states that when market conditions change, the 
consumer moves from one equilibrium to another. At each of these positions the 
condition of DMRS must hold, otherwise he could not take up such a position at all. In 
order to proceed from this to the law of DMRS it is necessary to assume that the 
condition holds at all intermediate points between two indifference curves and, in other 
words, that there no kinks between the two positions of equilibrium. Hicks concludes 
that being the simplest assumption possible, it is as good assumption to start with; and 
in fact its accordance with experience seems definitely good (Hicks 1939, p.24). 
 
The foundation of these arguments has been questioned by several authors. Wong (1978, 
p.38) suggests that Hicks, by confusing two separate issues, makes the issue of truth 
subsidiary to that of theoretical necessity. In his explanation, based on observed 
consumers’ behaviour, Hicks implicitly assumes that individuals always maximize their 
utility, under the constraints represented by the current system of prices and their 
available income. This justification turns into a circular argument rather than in a 
satisfactory proof for the universal validity of the principle of DMRS. As pointed out by 
Robinson (1962) utility is the quality in commodities that makes individuals want to buy 
them, the fact that individuals want to buy commodities show that they have utility. 
Then, the structure of preferences cannot be justified from the evidence that people do 
buy, because we are already assuming that people buy in accordance to those 
preferences that we are trying to infer from their behaviour. 
 
Similar objections to Hicks’ arguments have been moved from Paul Samuelson in 1938. 
For Samuelson, even if Hicks and Allen worked in this direction, ordinal utility theory 
failed to become an observational theory. In particular, an objection was addressed to 
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the principle of DMRS and to Hicks’s proof. Samuelson (1938) asks: why should one 
believe in the decreasing rate of marginal substitution3, except in so far as it leads to 
the type of demand functions in the market which seem plausible? 
 
Based on this objection, Samuelson’s objective, in 1938, consists in developing a new 
economic theory, which may achieve the main results of ordinal utility theory, but being 
entirely based on observable phenomena and free from all unnecessary restrictive 
conditions, dropping off, using Samuelson’s words, last vestiges of the utility analysis. 
In his 1938’s article, Samuelson gave the first description of the concept that ten years 
later, in 1948, he called “revealed preference” and formulated the postulate well-known 
as the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences (WARP). He states that if an individual 
selects batch one over batch two, he does not at the same time select two over one 
(Samuelson, 1938). More formally, the commodity bundle x is revealed preferred to the 
commodity bundle y (written xSy ) if for some competitive budget x is chosen when y is 
affordable. According to the weak axiom of revealed preferences, if xSy  we cannot 
have ySx .  
 
It is important to stress how Samuelson always used, in 1938, the term “select” instead 
of “prefer”, following his attempt to build a theory based on individuals’ behaviour, 
without any reference to the concept of utility. However, as pointed out by Wong 
(1978), Samuelson theory fails, until now, to be an explanation of consumer behaviour. 
While Hicks and Allen theory explains a consumer’s behaviour in terms of his 
preferences and his given material constraints, it is impossible to infer from Samuelson 
theory the reasons why one bundle was bought and all the others bundles were not. 
 
This issue is faced by Samuelson in 1948’s “Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed 
Preference”. Here, he states that if enough judiciously selected price-quantity situations 
are available for two goods, we may define a locus which is the precise equivalent of 
the conventional indifference curve. In this way, by comparing the costs of difference 
combinations of goods at different relative price situations, we can infer whether a 
given batch of goods is preferred to another one; the individual guinea pig, by his 
market behaviour, reveals his preference pattern, if there is such consistent pattern.  
 
This seems in strong contradiction with the previous article and, as stated by Wong 
(1978) it is highly questionable that the present aim of constructing an indifference map 
is a legitimate extension of a theory in which the use of utility or any other non-
observational concept is diligently avoided. The term “preference” has now a central 
role, while in the previous article it has never been used. Then, the purpose of 
Samuelson’s analysis is, in 1948, to drawn consistent preferences from observed 
consistent behaviour, where the consistency is defined according to the WARP.  
 
According to Wong (1978) this inference requires two assumptions. First of all we have 
got to assume that preferences do exist. Then, we need an assumption about consumers, 
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who are supposed to act in accordance with their preferences subject to material 
constraints. This is almost equivalent to assume the truth of ordinal utility theory and of 
its set of assumptions, which are not open to verification since, in order to prove their 
validity, we should be able to consider every possible combination of goods.. 
Consequently, Samuelson theory suffers of the same limitation, i.e. the circularity of the 
argument about preferences. Instead of being a new theory of consumer behaviour, it 
becomes an empirical verification of ordinal utility theory and a means of revealing 
consistent preferences. 
 
More recently, as we have seen in the previous paragraph, behavioural economics 
provided several examples in which mainstream economics fails to correctly predict 
consumers’ behaviour. Then, if sometimes individuals maximize their preferences not 
in accordance with the tenets of mainstream economics why should we base our test for 
logical consistency on a set of properties which do not have universal validity? 
Why individuals should be supposed to act more rationally in surveys than in reality? 
 
Adopting such an approach could lead to one of the following undesired situations listed 
by Wong4 (1978):  
1. behaviour which violates assumptions a-e does not imply that the consumer’s 
preferences are inconsistent; 
2. behaviour which satisfies the assumptions a-e not imply that the consumer’s 
preferences are consistent; 
3. inconsistent preferences may not necessarily detected through the use of a 
logical consistency (LC) test based on assumptions a-e. 
 
In the first case, behaviour which violates traditional assumptions does not imply that 
the consumer’s preferences are inconsistent. Consider for instance those individuals 
who, in the ultimatum game reported above, accept an allocation of (0$; 0$) rejecting a 
more convenient one of (92$; 8$). Excluding such choices would be incorrect as, in this 
case, agents fully understood the problem, evaluated the alternatives and correctly 
reported their preferences. These three conditions assure reliability of results, no matter 
whether they respect the homo economicus psychological profile or not.  
 
On the other hand, and here we are at the second undesired situation, behaviour which 
satisfies our axioms does not imply that the consumer’s preferences are consistent. Let’s 
think at the example about the hungry shopper. He fails to maximise his utility because 
of his current mental state. Analogously, while answering a survey, agents’ predictions 
about future utility could be biased by their current mental and emotional state. Maybe 
they will choose alternatives consistently one with the others and they would pass a 
logical consistency test, even if they selected a sub-optimal allocation.  
 
At this point an objection could be moved: where is the difference between a hungry 
shopper and an angry player, rejecting an allocation of (92$; 8$) in favour of another 
one of (0$; 0$)? The latter is not choosing optimally since, at 0t , the desire of revenge on 
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his opponent drives his preference toward an allocation that at 1t he will regret. Hence, a 
consistency test that allows classifying such a choice as irrational works right. In 
principle this objection seems reasonable, but it does not keep into account a 
fundamental difference between the two cases. In the first one, the hungry shopper can 
report his (biased) preferences through choices which are fully consistent with the 
axioms of rational choice. If it is the case, all consistency tests based on those axioms 
will catalogue such behaviour as rational, even if it fails to maximise utility. In the 
second case the angry player will maybe regret his choice, but maybe not. We can 
suppose that it depends on the temporal distance between 0t  and 1t , but we can also 
assume that his sense of justice simply cannot let him accept a compromise, no matter 
how much the time passed. However, testing logical consistency would lead, in this 
case, to a verdict of irrationality and to a consequent exclusion of these choices from the 
“clean” sample, even if the agent correctly anticipated his utility. Since it is not possible 
to check for dynamic consistency, as in SP we observe the choice in 0t  but we do not 
have any feedback about experienced utility in 1t , the exploitation of LC tests based on 
traditional assumptions about rationality involves two problematic issues: not only the 
exclusion of optimal choices but also the inclusion of sub-optimal ones. 
 
Even if the behavioural approach seems more appropriate to describe individuals’ 
behaviour, a problematic issue arises when we try to check the reliability of our results. 
The final goal of the researcher is to obtain, through the SP exercise, choices consistent 
with real preferences. Since in real markets we observe some situations where agents 
choose irrationally, how can we discriminate between reliable and unreliable statements? 
This issue can be analysed by considering separately the two groups of objection moved 
by the behavioural programme. 
 
First of all, we saw that assumptions which define the homo-economicus abstraction fail 
to have empirical verification, since sometimes they miss to keep into account factors 
which matter in driving agents’ behaviour. Recalling the example about the ultimatum 
game, in the third situation the player seems to choose irrationally, as he refuses a more 
convenient and available option. However if we observe the previous, unfair choice of 
his opponent, this behaviour does not seem irrational anymore. Simply (Sen, 1980), 
individuals’ utility is driven by both quantities (of money, commodities, etc.) and 
unobservable values (fairness, solidarity, etc.). In this case agents act rationally, but 
rationality cannot be defined in the restrictive way suggested by mainstream economics.  
 
In a SP context this kind of problem does not occur. Fictitious market scenarios provide 
a complete description of the economic environment. Utility and happiness coincide: 
since the alternatives are in general fully represented by their attributes, there is no 
reason to make allowance for unobservables, such as moral issues or ethical 
considerations. 
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The second group of objections concerns bounded rationality: sometimes agents fail to 
choose the preferred option because of their logical limitations. Hence, when we 
observe irrational choices in the SP exercise, how could we pretend to exclude them, if 
also in the real world individuals may behave in the same way? Moreover, how can we 
detect irrational choices if the assumptions on which mainstream economics bases the 
test for LC do not have universal validity?    
 
The first question can be answered by comparing the context of the survey study with 
real markets. In SP analysis respondents are usually asked to compare and evaluate a 
large number of alternatives, while in real markets the available options are usually a 
few. The mental effort connected with the participation to the SP exercise is higher 
compared with the intellectual strain generally experienced by individuals. Then, we 
can assume that those agents who report irrational preferences in the survey would not 
act in the same way in a real market context.   
 
But how to detect irrational choices? Recall again the ultimatum game.  Let’s say that 
this time the player who moves second can choose among three allocations: A(0$; 0$), 
B(92$; 8$), C(92$; 9$). Again, if he chooses option A because he wants to punish the 
unfair behaviour of his opponent, his preference cannot be defined as inconsistent. But 
the same reasoning does not hold when he opts for B since, given that the choice is not 
caused by the wish to damage the other player, this alternative is strictly dominated by 
C. Similarly, if we admit that preferences are reference-dependent, a consistency test 
can be carried out only among those choices which result from comparable scenarios.  
 
In general, logical consistency can be checked only by taking into account and keeping 
constant all the parameters that can influence the decision process of individuals. This is 
the case of a SP exercise where, as we said, the alternatives are in general fully 
represented by their attributes. We can think at this issue by referring again at the 
questions suggested by Kahneman and Thaler (2005) and cited above. From a decision 
utility perspective, the relevant question is the following: are preferences consistent with 
each other and with the axioms of rational choice? A positive answer assures reliability. 
But this result is misleading, since consistency with the axioms of rational choice does 
not always guarantee neither a reliable substitute for RP nor utility maximization.  
 
Then, from an experienced utility point of view, the issue of reliability could be 
addressed by adding a specification to the previous question: are preferences consistent 
with each other and with the axioms of rational choice, when the consistency with those 
rules is relevant, beyond any doubt, in explaining whether people choose the options 
they will most enjoy?  
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3. Surveys about attitudes and perceptions. 
In this paragraph we analyse another family of surveys. While in the previous case 
individuals were asked to choose the preferred option among different scenarios, and 
the reiteration of the decision process allowed checking for logical consistency, here 
agents are required to reveal their attitudes and perceptions.  
 
This kind of surveys can be divided into two groups: 
1. the first group includes all those situations where agents are required to reveal 
their actual behaviour, which cannot be observed by the researcher. For instance, 
respondents may be asked about the number of hours spent watching TV, about 
their political views, their income, etc.; 
2. the second group is composed by the surveys in which agents are asked to 
express their feelings or perceptions about a certain aspect of their life. For 
example, they may be required about their satisfaction with life or about their 
perceived health status. 
 
In these cases there is no way of checking for logical consistency, since all choices are 
equally rational and, by choosing only once, people cannot contradict themselves. 
Also the distinction between the mainstream economic and the behavioural approach 
does not hold anymore, since standard economic theory often rejects this kind of 
surveys, which are supposed to be unscientific and unreliable since their results are not 
objectively observable. Again, we are back to the conflict between decision and 
experienced utility. Followers of the traditional approach are persuaded that utility can 
be inferred directly from choices, while behavioural economists suggest that happiness 
is not only a matter of quantities (of commodities consumed, of money owned, etc.) but 
also depends on other, more qualitative, issues, undetectable through classical RP 
studies. How can be explained, for instance, the paradox that in several countries since 
Wold War II real income has drastically risen but the perception of subjective well-
being of the population has not increased or has even fallen slightly (Frey and Stutzer 
2001, Rabin 2002)?  
 
In the same way as for the first family of surveys the issue of reliability is relevant in 
order to fully understand the usefulness and limitations of such analysis. 
The main peculiarity which distinguishes the first group of surveys from the second one 
is the existence of a true and objective answer. For instance, when asked about the time 
spent watching TV agents may lie, because they find more appropriate to report a lower 
number of hours compared with the real one. However, if the researcher were able to 
observe agents’ behaviour, he would know the correct answer, in this case the number 
of hours individuals truly spend watching TV. 
 
Some researchers demonstrated the existence, also for this kind of surveys, of what we 
defined in the previous section as justification bias. Respondents may misreport their 
actual behaviour since they may avoid looking bad in front of the interviewer (Bertrand 
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and Mullainathan, 2001). Agents could also misreport their behaviour unintentionally, 
due to cognitive factors such as question wording, ordering of questions, etc5. Bertrand 
and Mullainathan (2001) report an example still concerning the time spent watching TV. 
A sample of German respondents was been asked about how many hours of TV they 
watch per day. A first group of individuals have been presented with a questionnaire 
with ten options, starting from “less than thirty minutes” and then proceeding in half an 
hour increments up till “more than four hours and a half”. The second group of 
respondents had to answer a questionnaire where the lowest option was “two hours and 
a half”. In the first sample, only 16 respondents out of 100 declared to watch more than 
two hours and a half of TV per day, whilst in the second group the same share was 
about 32 per cent. This evidence is due to the fact that respondents appear to infer 
“normal” TV viewing from the scale of the questionnaire. 
Whichever the source of bias, it is impossible to evaluate the reliability of answers 
through an ex-post analysis. In this particular case attitudes are objective and known 
only by respondents. Then, the only method that could increase the reliability of such 
surveys works ex-ante, and consists in clarifying which cognitive factors can increase 
the bias of results and improving the quality of questionnaires’ architecture (Sunstein 
and Thaler, 2008). 
 
In the second subgroup of surveys, where agents are required to express their 
perceptions and feelings, the problem of reliability is more complex.  
This time there is not any objective answer to the survey questions. Consider for 
example a researcher interested in investigating consumers’ satisfaction about public 
transport. Suppose he asks two individuals who shared the same travel experience, and 
both of them honestly report their opinion. The first one reports a low level of 
satisfaction (say two out of ten), whilst the other is fairly satisfied (he scores seven). 
What can be learnt from such a result? With respect to the previous case, this time 
attitudes are not objective, as for the number of hours spent watching TV. Here 
perceptions are based on personal perceptions and evaluations which depend on several 
unobservable and subjective factors.  
 
Some examples come from the health economic literature. McFadden et al. (2005) 
report the case of a survey conducted in France and Denmark about self-rated health 
status. Evidence shows that 62 percent of Danish men defined “excellent” their health 
status, while in France the same answer occurred only for 14 respondents out of 100. 
Since, according to health statistics, French men have a life expectancy two years 
greater than Danish citizens, the result of this subjective survey seems in contradiction 
with objective evidence. Hence, in this kind of studies the issue of reliability involves 
the connection between subjective perceptions and objective values. The topic is 
relevant since often policy-makers and politicians are interested in collecting public 
opinion surveys and they are strongly motivated to maximise individuals’ satisfaction.  
If the latter properly represents objective and unobserved values (such as in the 
examples above, the quality of public transport and agents’ true health status) then 
surveys could constitute a useful support to public management and policy choice. 
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Recalling the example provided by McFadden (2005), one could object that correctly 
evaluating your own health status is much more difficult compared with reporting your 
satisfaction with public transport. In the first case the evaluation is based on personal 
feelings and individuals are forced to found their judgements on poor information, while 
when asked to rank their satisfaction with transport, they are perfectly aware of the price 
they paid, of coaches’ cleanliness and of all other relevant features of the service. 
Consequently, the relevance of our question, i.e. whether or not satisfaction and 
objective quality coincide is related to the quantity of information on which individuals 
base their judgements6.  
 
Suppose we want to investigate satisfaction with healthcare services provided by the 
public sector in a certain country7. Imagine patients to be very satisfied (as they usually 
are), even if we observe that objective indicators of quality do not support their 
enthusiasm. For example, physicians may prescribe more medicines than needed or 
hospitalize patients when it is not strictly required. Therefore, individuals receive bad 
assistance but they do not have enough information (here, medical skills) to realize it. In 
this case the issue concerning the relation between satisfaction and quality is strongly 
relevant and the two concepts probably do not coincide. Suppose now to replicate the 
same experiment about public transport and to get the same result: respondents are very 
satisfied with railways even if we observe low objective quality, for example coaches 
are often in delays. The only conclusion we can infer from this evidence is that people 
have weak preferences for time savings, but we would not worry about it as in the 
previous example.  
  
In general, service quality can be defined by the set of features which drives 
individuals’ preferences. In the extreme (and unrealistic) case, if consumers are able to 
observe all these characteristics and to base their choices and evaluations on them, then 
quality and satisfaction coincide.  
 
However, this reasoning does not hold anymore in a comparison between different 
groups of individuals asked to judge different items. Suppose to find evidence similar to 
the one showed by McFadden (2005) about public transport: Danish travellers are more 
satisfied than French ones. For instance, the former attribute on average a score of nine 
out of ten to transport service, while the latter give a rating of seven out of ten. From 
this result we could make two assumptions. The first one is about the quality of 
transport service in each country. As in the previous case, if we think that consumers’ 
satisfaction properly describes objective quality, we can infer useful information from 
our survey. The second assumption concerns the information about the relative quality 
of one transport service compared with the other. In this case, we shall assume that 
transport services work better in Denmark than in France. But this interpretation does 
not keep into account the fact that we have two distinct items (public transport in 
Denmark and France) judged by two different groups of respondents (Danish and 
French).  
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In this context, the issue of reliability involves not only the concept of objectivity with 
respect to “real” quality, but also the problem of comparability between different groups 
of individuals. For example, due to some social norms or cultural factors, French could 
be more severe in judging public services than Danish, and this effect could partially 
explain the different pattern of satisfactions emphasized by the survey. 
 
Perceptions are affected by individual-specific characteristics, such as income, gender, 
education, and by group-specific feature, as social norms, cultural factors, etc. 
Moreover, such as for the first subgroup of surveys, reported subjective satisfaction and 
wellbeing may depend on the order of questions, the wording of questions, scales 
applied, actual mood, and the selection of information processed (Frey and Stutzer, 
2002). Some of these factors could be group specific. For example, in some countries 
university grades are expressed o a scale from one to twenty. In a cross-country survey, 
respondents who attended university in those countries will have a different perception 
of the scale compared with individuals graduated elsewhere and with people who did 
not attend university at all. 
 
Hence, surveys of this kind can provide reliable information only if, in an ex post 
analysis, are kept into account all those characteristics which are peculiar of each group 
of respondents and relevant in the choice process. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2001) 
and Grassi and Puglisi (2007) suggested econometrical techniques for isolating country-
specific effect, in order to assure a reliable interpretation of surveys conducted in 
different countries.  
  
4. Conclusions. 
The aim of SP analysis is to provide policy makers with some information about 
individuals’ preferences. The goodness of the policy chosen crucially depends on the 
reliability of SP.  
 
We classified SP methods in two big families. The first one comprehends all those cases 
in which agents are required to replicate their market behaviour by choosing among 
different hypothetical option the preferred one. In this case the issue of reliability can be 
analysed from two different perspectives. 
 
According to mainstream economics, agents’ behaviour is characterised by unbounded 
rationality, unbounded willpower and unbounded selfishness. Then, the sole source of 
bias is represented by the intentional choice of some people to misreport their 
preferences in order to affect the policy chosen in a direction they find beneficial. 
Without any monetary mechanism attached to the process of revelation of preferences, 
dominant truth-revealing strategies do not hold. However, by adopting the model about 
informative lobbying (Crawford and Sobel, 1982) can be shown that in some cases the 
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policy-maker finds still convenient to ask agents about their preferences because, by 
doing so, the expected welfare loss is not lower than the one he would obtain by setting 
the policy chosen at random. In any case it is not possible for the researcher to detect, 
ex-post, misreported preferences, unless they violate assumptions about logical 
consistency.  
 
The violations of the assumption which define the homo-economics abstraction have 
been identified as a relevant source of unreliability by some authors (Forster and 
Mourato, 2002). This approach is questionable. By observing inconsistent preferences 
we are admitting that some agents behave irrationally, which turns to be a rejection of 
our theory. This reasoning reflects the circularity of some arguments used in order to 
give empirical justification and universal validity to the homo-economicus portrait. 
Some authors (Wong, 1978) showed how both ordinal utility theory and the Samuelson 
programme failed to provide empirical verification of these assumptions. Hence, if they 
are not always consistent with the maximisation of individual preferences, there is no 
reason why individual preferences should be consistent with this set of assumptions. 
 
The so called behavioural programme (Mullainathan and Thaler 2000) constitutes the 
second perspective from which we can analyse the problem of SP reliability. While 
Samuelson was looking for a justification of ordinal utility theory based on observations 
of market behaviour, the behavioural programme focuses on those market behaviours 
which do not respect the assumptions of mainstream economics. According to this 
approach two sources of bias can affect SP results. Agents may still have an incentive to 
falsify their choices because, as in the previous case, they want to manipulate the policy 
chosen in a certain profitable direction. They could also fail to correctly report their 
preferences, because of bounded rationality. This occurrence is now acceptable, since 
our theory does not assume individuals to be fully rational.  
 
The latter consideration implies a new objection to the possibility to test the logical 
consistency of SP results. If we observe irrational choices in the SP exercise, how could 
we pretend to exclude them, if also in the real world individuals may behave in the same 
way? Moreover, if the assumptions about consumers’ behaviour does not have universal 
validity, on which basis could we distinguish between consistent and inconsistent 
statements? 
 
The answer concerns the peculiarities of SP exercises compared with real market 
situations. Fictitious market scenarios provide a complete description of the economic 
environment. Then, utility and happiness coincide: since the alternatives are in general 
fully represented by their attributes, there is no reason to make allowance for 
unobservables, such as moral issues or ethical considerations. In such a context the LC 
test can be based on the axioms of rational choice, if the consistency with those rules is 
relevant, without any doubt, in explaining whether people choose the options they will 
most enjoy. 
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The last section was devoted to the last family of surveys. In this case the object of the 
interview defines two subgroups of surveys.  
 
In the first case individuals are asked to reveal their actual attitudes, as the number of 
hours spent watching TV. The peculiarity of such questions is the existence of a true 
and objective answer, for example the real number of hours spent watching TV. Since 
the objective answer cannot be observed by the researchers, the latter has to trust the 
respondents, who may have some incentives to misreport their behaviour or could be 
affected by several factors (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2001). 
 
The second subgroup of surveys refers to those analyses in which individuals are asked 
to report their feelings or their satisfaction with a certain aspect of their life. With 
respect to the previous case perceptions are based on personal perceptions and 
evaluations which depend on several unobservable and subjective factors. In the last 
decades the interest for this kind of studies largely increased and policy-makers are 
often interested in public opinion surveys since they may be interested in choosing those 
policies which maximise consumers’ satisfaction. Then, the connection between 
satisfaction and objective quality is particularly relevant, especially when individuals 
have poor information on which base their judgements.  
 
In this context, the issue of reliability involves not only the concept of objectivity with 
respect to “real” quality, but also the problem of comparability between different groups 
of individuals, since perceptions are affected by both individual-specific characteristics, 
such as education or income and by group-specific feature, such as social norms and 
cultural factors. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Actually when ∆ is equal to the boundary level the agent is indifferent between a fair statement and an 
unfair answer. However, we assume that he prefers to behave honestly because it is morally preferable. 
2 While behavioural economists tend to generalize this finding, some authors showed resistance to accept 
it as a systematic, non-negligible departure fro the traditional framework. For a critical review of the 
literature see Plott and Zeiler, 2004. 
3 In “A Reconsideration of the Theory of Value” (1934) Hicks and Allen talk about an increasing 
marginal rate of substitution, since they simply look at the change in utility the other way up the 
indifference curve. In the following publications they change the terminology and substitute increasing 
with decreasing. Here Samuelson, who refers to the 1934’s article, still uses the former terminology. 
4 Wong refers to the WARP  but the same situations can be adapted to the set of assumptions about the 
homo economicus profile. 
5 For a brief review see Betrand and Mullainathan (2001) and Frey and Stutzer (2001). 
6 Agents’ statements can be still affected by cognitive bias, incentives to misreport their opinions, 
influence of cognitive factors, etc. Here we are assuming that individuals are honestly reporting their 
perceptions and that the latter are not affected by any source of bias.  
7 In this example we are still assuming agents to exactly report their satisfaction. 
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Logical consistency in choice experiments: an 
application to the value of travel time. 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. Stated preferences methods (SP) offer a direct approach to estimating willingness to pay 
(WTP) for changes in provision of non-market goods as, e.g., the value of time. These methods are 
commonly used in Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) and in project evaluations. The goodness of the 
estimation of shadow prices crucially depends on the reliability of collected answers. In other words, 
it is subordinated to the occurrence that people would reproduce in a real context the same behaviour 
expressed into the questionnaire. As pointed out by some researchers (Forster and Mourato, 1997), 
in many SP studies a certain number of choices seem not to respect basic assumptions of rationality. 
The aim of a logical consistency (LC) test consists in verifying consistency with the prediction of the 
economic theory. Following previous literature about the same topic, the research questions 
addressed by this work is dual. In the first place we want to investigate the occurrence of 
inconsistent choices and their effect on WTP estimations. The second issue concerns the 
relationships between problematic choices and respondents’ individual characteristics. 
Hence, a LC test has been applied on the results of a survey aimed to the evaluation of the value of 
travel time (VOT), expressly carried out for this research. Results show how nearly a quarter of 
respondents failed to provide coherent answers. The inclusion of inconsistent choices in the 
evaluation of travel time has a significant effect on WTP estimates. The probability to choose 
inconsistently seems to depend positively on age. 
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1. Introduction. 
The term Stated Preferences (SP) refers to a family of techniques1 which uses individual 
respondents’ statements about their preferences in a set of options to estimate utility 
functions. The options are typically descriptions of situations or contexts constructed by 
the researcher. In a choice experiment a scenario refers to a choice set, and the 
respondent is merely asked to select his preferred option from the alternatives of the set. 
This method corresponds with the usual discrete choice (Revealed Preferences model, 
RP) approach, except that both the alternatives and the responses are hypothetical. 
From ’70s on, in many countries it is common practice to estimate the shadow price of 
non-market goods, such as time and pollution, trough SP analysis. These estimations are 
widely implemented in Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) appraisals and project evaluations. 
Despite the number of advantages relative to RP methods2 , also with SP methods 
researchers have to deal with some issues. Several sources of bias could affect the 
output of the estimation.  
 
The structure of the questionnaire, the order of hypothetical alternatives and the 
attributes’ level could have a significant effect on both respondents’ choices. 
Some authors investigated these issues and provided new design techniques for SP 
studies. Mc Fadden (1986) observes how factors such as learning, boredom, or 
anchoring to earlier tasks may distort the measurement of preferences. Fowkes et al. 
(2000) and Bates (1986) examined the effect of questionnaire designs on the WTP 
estimation and discussed the goodness of some characteristics, such as orthogonality3, 
in SP surveys.  
 
Another source of bias derives from the fact that respondents may deliberately give 
biased answers, in the hope of affecting the outcome of the analysis (policy-response 
bias) or of easting their existing behaviour in a better light (justification bias)4. These 
kinds of bias are not easily identifiable, since we do not observe “real” preferences and 
consequently, we have to trust in respondents’ statements. 
 
Even with a well suited questionnaire, and under the assumption that all respondents 
will seriously and honestly face the SP exercise, a source of bias is still represented by 
the cognitive difficulty associated with multiple complex choices between scenarios 
with many attributes and levels. The relevance of this noisy element varies among 
individuals, since some of them can find the task easier than others, due to a 
combination of observable (age, education, profession) and unobservable factors.  
 
Summing up all this factors, SP studies can be biased by an improper design of the 
questionnaire, by a strategic behaviour of the respondents and by the lower ability of 
some individuals to answer the questionnaire. Unfortunately, most of these factors 
cannot be detected and we are not able to check whether collected SP coincide with RP.  
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However, since economic theory provides us some suggestions about individuals’ 
behaviour, we can check the consistency of these assumptions with SP. As Forster and 
Mourato (1997, 2002) observe, the existing literature contains few systematic attempts 
to examine whether the collected answers satisfy certain condition of logical 
consistency (LC), in accordance to the predictions of economic theory. Their 
contribution investigates the occurrence of inconsistent choices in a contingent ranking 
experiment. Saelensminde (2002) replicates the exercise in a choice experiment aimed 
at the estimation of the value of travel time (VOT). 
 
Following Saelensminde (2002), the purpose of this paper is to observe the effect of the 
inclusion of inconsistent choices on VOT evaluations and to underline the connections 
between the tendency to choose inconsistently and individual characteristics. Compared 
with previous literature the LC test is less restrictive, as it will be discussed in the next 
sections. The study uses data from a survey specifically conducted for this work and 
aimed at the evaluation of the VOT for train travellers between Turin and Milan. A 
sample of 407 travellers has been asked to answer a questionnaire composed by a set of 
nine couples of travel alternatives, each of them including only two attributes, in order 
to simplify the task for the respondents. The last section looks for a relationship 
between the tendency of choosing inconsistently and some observable socio-economic 
variables. 
2. Time allocation theory.    
The first attempt to consider time as a commodity goes up to Becker (1965). He 
suggested that individual utility does not derive from goods consumed directly but from 
“final goods” iZ ,  
( , )i i i iZ f x t=  
defined as a function of a vector of market goods and a vector of time inputs used in 
producing the ith commodity. Then, time enters the utility function through iZ . In this 
model the time constraint is not explicitly defined. It is incorporated into the traditional 
budget constraint as time can be converted into goods by using less time at consumption 
and more at work. Hence, the consumption activity has a time cost, equal to the cost of 
not earning money. Then, in its first acceptation, the VOT is equal to the wage rate, 
independently from the allocation of time between different kinds of activities, pleasant 
or not.  
 
Johnson (1966) modifies the structure of the utility function which depends, in his 
model, on three separate attributes: money income, time spent at work and hours of 
leisure. In this way he shows that the value of time plus the subjective value of work, 
defined as the ratio between the marginal utility of work to the marginal utility of 
income. As the former is assumed to be negative while the latter is positive, the value of 
leisure or any use of time will be less than the money wage rate. In other words, the 
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intrinsic value of saving time is equal to the difference between the wage rate and the 
disutility of labour. 
 
Oort (1969) includes travel time in the utility function as well. The VOT is then equal to 
the sum of the intrinsic value of saving time, which is the definition given by Johnson 
(1966), and the marginal utility of the transport activity itself, assumed to be negative. 
In both Johnson (1966) and Oort (1969) model, beside a budget constraint, a time 
constraint shows that the sum of leisure and work time cannot overcome the daily time 
endowment.  
 
The first attempt to generalize these results is due to DeSerpa (1971). In this model he 
considers a set of commodity bundles 
1 1( ,..., , ,..., )n nx x x t t=  
Where ix  denotes the quantity of ith consumption good and it  denotes the time 
allocated to the ith good. One of this activity is work and it is denoted by wt , which 
enters separately in the direct utility function: ( , , )wU x t t . Defining w  as the wage rate 
and y  as the amount of income available from non-work sources, the traditional budget 
constraint results 
wpx w t y= ⋅ +                                                        (1) 
According to the previous literature, time is constrained as well and following 
relationship between total available time (T) and time spent in various alternatives must 
hold 
i wT t t≥ +∑                                                             (2) 
At this stage DeSerpa notices that some activities, e.g. a trip, require a minimum 
amount of time ( *it ) for their consumption. In order to make more realistic the model he 
introduces a number of time constraints equal to the number of activities  
*
i it t>                                                              (3) 
*
w wt t>                                                             (4) 
Hence, the utility function must be maximized subject to (1), (2), (3) and (4). 
Writing the Lagrangean as 
* *( , , ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )w w i w w w i i iL U x t t wt y px T t t t t t tλ µ φ ψ= + + − + − − + − + −∑ ∑  
 FOCs follow: 
/ 0
/ 0
/ 0
i i
j j
w
U x p
U t
U t w
λ
µ ψ
λ µ φ
∂ ∂ − =

∂ ∂ − + =
∂ ∂ + − + =
 
The marginal valuation of time spent in activity j is the ratio of the marginal utility of 
activity j to the marginal utility of income:  
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/ /i
j w
U U
w
t t
φ λ ψ λ
λ λ
∂ ∂
= + + −
∂ ∂
 
where the first term on the right hand side is the VOT as defined by Becker (1965), 
while the first two terms represent the result of Johnson (1966). 
The same formula can be obtained by dividing the second FOC by λ : 
1
/ /i
j
U
t
µ λ ψ λ
λ
∂
= −
∂
 
From this formulation DeSerpa defined three types of values and the relationship 
established among them. The VOT as a resource ( /µ λ ) is defined as the value of 
extending the time period when the time constraint is not binding. It represents the WTP 
for an increase in the total time budget. The second is the VOT allocated in a certain 
activity (VOT as a commodity), given by the rate of substitution between that activity 
and money in the utility function. This would be equal to ( /µ λ ) only if the individual 
assigns more time to an activity than the minimum required. If it is the case, this 
particular activity will be classified among leisure activities for which, as a consequence, 
the value of saving time is zero. The third concept is the value of saving time in activity 
i (value of transferring time), defined as the difference between the marginal valuations 
of time spent in the activity i and the resource value, equal to /iψ λ . It is this concept 
which is conventionally referred to as the VOT in transport appraisals (Layard and 
Glaister, 2003). 
3.  Methodology. 
3.1. Discrete travel choice.  
Discrete choice models are the most common type of travel demand models. Empirical 
measurement, such as RP methods, is confined to situations involving choices between 
two or more mutually exclusive alternatives. The (indirect) utility level attached to each 
alternative is usually represented a s a linear combination of cost and characteristics of 
each alternative and other general effects, e.g. depending on socio-economic variables 
for each group of individuals. But the revealed choice cannot be entirely explained by 
observable factors, since other unobserved variables, as personal tastes, could enter the 
consumer’s decision process. In other words, there is a random element which cannot be 
determined (Manski, 1977). Thus the basic random utility formulation is that: 
( ),i i iU U V e=  
which is commonly simplified to the additive formulation    
i i iU V e= +  
Where iV  is the deterministic part of the utility function and, as a further simplification, 
is usually specified as a linear-in parameters function of a coefficient vector β  and a 
vector of explanatory variables. Whether the model is calibrate on individual 
observation, econometrical technique estimates that set of coefficients which, when 
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inserted into the formula of V , maximises the joint probability across all the 
observations of the choices made by the respondents. This allows values of travel time 
to be estimated as the ratio of the estimated utility weights of travel time to that of cost.  
For example, consider the case of n  individuals who have to choose between i 
alternatives (i = car, train) defined only by two attributes: travel time and cost. Then, the 
observable part of the indirect utility V of the alternative chosen i can be written as 
0 cos cosni time i t iV time tβ β β= + +  
This specification is largely used in transportation appraisals in order to evaluate the 
VOT as the ratio between the coefficients related to time and cost. As Domencich and 
McFadden  (1975) show, based on the assumption that the set of ie  are independent 
from irrelevant alternatives (IIA) with a Gumbel distribution, leads to the multinomial 
logit model. Hence, the probability of the car to be chosen (car is set equal to 1 and train 
is equal to 0) can be written as: 
( )
1
Pr( 1)
1
ncar
ncar ntrain ncar ntrain
V
n V V V V
e
y
e e e− −
= = =
+ +
 
where ny is the choice stated by the nth respondent 
In this work we applied to our analysis a multinomial logit model using package 
NLOGIT developed by Limdep.  
 
3.2.LC and individual characteristics.  
 
The relationships between inconsistent choices and individual characteristics has been 
analysed from two different perspectives.  
 
In the first one, a binomial logit model is applied. Logical skills act as the latent, 
unobserved variable in the model 
*y X eβ= +  
where e  is a continuously distributed variable independent of  X and the distribution of 
e  is symmetric about zero. Instead of the latent variable *y we observe a binary 
variable iy , which is equal to 1 if the ith respondent chose inconsistently and is equal to 
0 otherwise. If the cumulative distribution function of e  is assumed to follow a standard 
logistic distribution, such as 
( ) ( ) exp( ) /[1 exp( )]G e e e e= Λ ≡ +  
the traditional binomial logit model follows. 
 
Another way to look at the same issue involves Bayesian networks (Pearl, 2000). These 
methods are largely used in biology and medicine literature, whilst a few applications 
have been carried out in economic literature. 
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A Bayesian Network (BN) is a graphical model for probabilistic relationships among a 
set of variables. Each variable is represented by a node in a graph. The direct 
dependencies between the variables are represented by directed edges between the 
corresponding nodes and the conditional probabilities for each variable (that is the 
probabilities conditioned on the various possible combinations of values for the 
immediate predecessors in the network) are stored in potentials (or tables) attached to 
the dependent nodes. Information about the observed value of a variable is propagated 
through the network to update the probability distributions over other variables that are 
not observed directly. Using Bayes’ rule, these influences may also be identified in a 
‘backwards’ direction, from dependent variables to their predecessors (Heckerman, 
1996). 
 
 Hence, a BN consists of the following (Jensen and Nielsen, 2007): 
1. a set of variables and a set of directed edges between variables; 
2. each variable has a finite set of mutually exclusive state; 
3. the variable together with the direct edges form an directed acyclic graph (DAG); 
a directed graph is acyclic if there is no directed path 1 ... nA A→ → so that 
1 nA A= ; 
4. to each variable A  with parents 1,..., nB B  a conditional probability table 
1( ,..., )nP A B B ) is attached; 
5. The joint probability 1( ,..., )nP A A factorises along the graph: that is if 
( )A iΠ denotes the set of parents of the variable iA (and the empty set if iA does 
not have any parents), then 
1
1
( ,..., ) ( ( ))
n
n i
i
P A A P A A iΠ
=
=∏  
In empirical works, researchers handle a sample of cases from a network N over the 
universeU . Starting from this sample, the object consists in reconstructing the BN from 
the cases. In order to reach this goal, two methodologies are usually applied.  
 
The constraint-based methods establish a set of conditional independence statements 
holding for the data, and use this set to build a network corresponding to the conditional 
independence properties determined.  In other words, as a first step the skeleton of the 
BN is determined by analysing conditional independences among variables and then the 
arcs are directed.  
 
The score-based methods produce a series of candidate Bayesian networks, calculate a 
score for each candidate, and return the candidate of highest score. This score represents 
an indicator for the probability that our sample could have been generated by each BN 
candidate. The network which fits better the sample will receive the highest score and 
will be chosen. Naturally, we are assuming that our dataset constitutes a correct 
representation of the “true” network, N . 
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Several software employ algorithms and models devoted to BN’s estimations. In this 
application we use the package R and the library bnlearn (Scutari, 2010). Compared 
with other software, the advantage of using this package relies in the possibility to 
perform both constrained-based and score-based methods on our sample, testing several 
and alternative algorithms. The main disadvantage is connected to the impossibility to 
mix in our data set continuous variables (such as age) and factors. Even if some libraries 
(deal, Bottcher and Dethlefsen, 2007) handle networks with mixed variables, their 
learning procedure is still experimental and hardly applicable to complex models. 
For this reason all variables have been converted into factors, as it will be explained 
with more details in the sixth paragraph. 
4. Survey design. 
The data set used in this paper includes the results of a survey about the VOT, 
specifically performed for this research in June and July 2008.  
A sample of 407 second-class travellers5 on the regional train between Turin and Milan 
has been asked to answer a questionnaire, whose design is shaped based on other studies 
conducted in a similar environment (TRT, 2001).  
 
Respondents had to choose between two travel alternatives in nine different 
hypothetical scenarios. Each journey is described by two attributes: ticket price and 
travel time. The transport mode and its characteristics (comfort, cleanness, etc.) are 
assumed to be constant across alternatives. Respondents have also been asked about 
some individual characteristics such as age, gender, income, level of education and use 
of the transportation mode (journeys per month), reason of the journey (work or leisure 
trips). A more detailed description of the questionnaire is available in the appendix, 
jointly with some descriptive statistics about the respondents. 
 
At the end of the questionnaire, after the SP exercise, some questions tried to investigate 
travellers’ behaviour and their attitude to attach a monetary value to the time saved. 
More details about this section are given in the next paragraph. 
5. The problem of LC.  
When performing a SP analysis, the final goal of the researcher is to get a perfect 
substitute for unobserved RP. As a consequence, the reliability of collected data 
depends on their capability to predict real preferences. Since the latter are unknown, it is 
not possible to compare statements with actual behaviours. However we can, ex ante, 
make some assumptions about individuals’ market behaviour and, ex post, check 
whether these hypothesis hold across statements. If our results are consistent with our 
assumptions we can suppose individuals properly reported they preferences. If it is not 
the case, we will doubt about the reliability of SP and we could decide to drop from our 
sample those choices which are inconsistent with our hypothesis.   
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The possibility to check about LC crucially depends on the design of the questionnaire. 
Foster and Mourato (2002) look at three different aspects of LC within the context of a 
contingent ranking experiment: dominance, rank consistency and transitivity6. Summing 
up all inconsistencies, Forster and Mourato (2002) detected problematic choices in 41 
cases out of 100. 
 
Compared with choice experiments, a limitation of the ranking approach lies in the 
added cognitive difficulty associated with many attributes and levels. Consequently, it is 
easier to find irrational choices among the answers given by the respondents. On the 
other hand, the construction of the questionnaire allows to check for several kinds of 
inconsistent choices, while in choice experiments only dominance problems can be 
observed, since they involve just one or two hypothetical comparisons. 
 
Before testing the reliability of SP results we have to check the robustness of our 
assumptions. In other words, keeping in mind our very final objective, we must define 
our hypothesis consistently with individuals’ actual behaviour.  
 
Saelensminde (2002) tries to investigate the impact of choice inconsistencies by using 
the results from a VOT study conducted in Denmark. In this experiment travel 
alternatives are described by three attributes: price, travel time and headway, defined as 
the number of hours between each departure. Inconsistencies are identified by 
considering the linear combinations of the valuation of travel time and headway and, 
according to the continuity axiom, it is assumed that the respondents trade-off gains in 
travel time against losses in headway, and vice versa. Empirical results show how, 
given this formulation of the LC test, about 75.5 per cent of train travellers chose 
inconsistently.  
 
For example, suppose to present travellers with two couples of alternatives. In each case 
(A and B), travellers are asked to choose between two scenarios the one they prefer. 
Following Saelensminde (2002), if the respondent in choice A chooses the cheapest 
option (scenario 1), then he/she is not willing to pay 2 euro more for a reduction in 
travel time of 15 minutes and a decrease in headway of one hour. 
This behaviour indicates that his/her valuation of reduced headway is less than 2 euro 
per hour and the valuation of reduced travel time is below 8 euros per hour, as depicted 
by the green line in figure 1.  
 
Following the same reasoning, if the respondent chooses the most expansive option in 
choice B (scenario 2), his/her WTP for time will be higher than 9 euro/hour and his/her 
WTP for a reduction in headway will be above 3 euro/hour, as shown by the red lines in 
figure 1. The simultaneous choice of the first scenario in (A) and of the second one in 
(B) implies a failure of the consistency test, since preferences are contradictory. Two 
observations can be moved to this definition of LC.  
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Figure 1. Logical consistency: choice A vs choice B. 
 
 Choice A Choice B 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Travel time 1h 45 1h 30 1h 45 1h 25 
Price 8 euro 10 euro 8 euro 11 euro 
Headway 6 hours 5 hours 6 hours 5 hours 
 
Valuation of 
headway (euro/h) 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
0
1
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4
5
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Valuation of travel time (euro/h) 
 
First of all behavioural economic literature pointed out how individuals often base their 
choices on rules of thumb, as a way to economize on cognitive faculties (Mullainathan 
and Thaler, 2000). In the case represented in figure 1 we are assuming agents’ WTP to 
be constant and unrelated to the size of the time saving offered (respectively 15 and 20 
minutes in choice A and B). In our questionnaire we tried to investigate the realism of 
this assumption. Train travellers between Turin and Milan (length of journey: 1h 45’) 
have been asked through three direct questions about their WTP.  
 
The purpose of the first question was just to let them understand the object of the 
interview: if I offered you another ticket, a little bit more expensive compared to the one 
you bought today in order to save a minute of travel time, would you buy it? Obviously 
all respondents answered “no”.  
 
The second question was the following: does it exist a minimum amount of time that I 
should offer you, in order to convince you to buy a more expensive ticket with respect to 
the one you bought today? This time answers differ meaningfully among respondents 
(table 1). None of the respondents would accept an increase in the price of the ticket 
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without a correspondent reduction in travel time of, at least, ten minutes. 16 per cent of 
the sample is not able to quantify the minimum amount of travel time that would justify 
a higher price. Then, referring to figure 1, in a RP context we could observe some 
individuals who accept the expensive option in choice B but reject the cheapest one in 
choice A. As a consequence such a choice cannot be defined as inconsistent.  
 
Moreover, in the model proposed by DeSerpa (1971) each activity requires a minimum 
amount of time for its consumption. In a choice experiment respondents are asked about 
their WTP for a decrease in travel time. In accepting or refusing a certain option, 
travellers evaluate the opportunity to spend the time saved into another activity, which 
is constrained by a minimum amount of time. If the time saving is too small they will 
not find anything else to do, and the utility gained will simply be equal to the avoided 
disutility of travel. For example, no one would pay for a one minute decrease in travel 
time.  
 
If the size of the time saving increases, agents will be able to invest this time into other 
consumption or work activities, so that the gain in utility will be equal to the avoided 
disutility of travel plus the utility connected with the new occupation. In other words, 
we are assuming that the value of transferring time is not constant, since time has no 
value per se but only in relation to its use. Again, the choice discussed in figure 1 
cannot be defined as inconsistent.  
 
The same reasoning holds for the size of monetary costs. Consider for example choices 
C and D. Figure 2 shows how WTP changes if the respondent accepts or refuses each 
option. According to Saelensminde (2002) this time LC would be violated by the choice 
of the cheapest option in C (scenario 1) and the most expansive one in D (scenario 2).  
 
A third question tried to investigate travellers’ ability to attach a monetary value to the 
minimum amount of time for which they would be willing to suffer an increase in the 
price. Question wording was: how much, if it exists, is the maximum amount of money 
that you would be willing to pay in exchange for a time saving? Answers significantly 
differ among individuals. This time the number of respondents is lower (340) since 
those who answered “no idea” in the previous question have not been asked. Some 
travellers are not able to quantify the threshold (15.45 per cent), some others (11.18 per 
cent) answer in proportion to the current price of the train ticket (table 2). 
 
Empirical evidence seems to show the existence of thresholds, both for time and cost. 
Below a certain level of time and above a certain level of price travellers’ WTP tends to 
zero. Because of this evidence, in this study LC is defined in a less restrictive way. First 
of all travel alternatives are characterised by two attributes instead of three as in the 
previous examples: travel time and price. This design significantly reduces the mental 
effort for the respondents. LC is not checked though WTP but by comparing attributes’ 
levels between choices. 
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Figure 2. Logical consistency: choice C vs choice D. 
 
 Choice C Choice D 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Travel time 1h 45 1h 20 1h 45 1h 30 
Price 8 euro 14 euro 8 euro 12 euro 
Headway 6 hours 4 hours 6 hours 5 hours 
 
Valuation of  
headway (euro/h) 
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                                                                   Valuation of travel time (euro/h) 
Consider for example the two following situations, A and B. 
 
 Choice A Choice B 
 Scenario A1 Scenario A2 Scenario B1 Scenario B2 
Travel time 1h 45 1h 30 1h 45 1h 20 
Price 8 euro 10 euro 8 euro 13 euro 
 
 
If a respondent chooses alternative A1, his/her WTP is lower than 8 euro/hour. But in 
the second scenario he could prefer alternative B2, even if the value of each unit of time 
saved is higher (higher than 12 euro/hour), as the amount of time saved (25 minutes) 
could justify this behaviour. In other words, since 1 1A B= , we could write:  
1 2
2 1
A A
B A
f
f
  
As we can not infer that 2 2A Bf , the choice does not violate LC. 
Consider now choices C and D. 
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 Choice C Choice D 
 Scenario C1 Scenario C2 Scenario D1 Scenario D2 
Travel time 1h 45 1h 30 1h 45 1h 30 
Price 8 euro 10 euro 8 euro 10.50 euro 
 
In this case the simultaneous choice of alternative C1 and D2 is not logically consistent, 
because in the scenario D2 the time saved is the same as in C2 (15 minutes) but the fare 
is higher. Since 1 1C D=  the choice can be written as 
1 2
2 1
C C
D C
f
f
 
But this time we know, assuming a strongly monotone preference relation, 
that 2 2C Df . Since this relation contradicts the SP of the respondent, his/her choices 
violate the LC test. 
 
The same reasoning holds if we keep constant the amount of time saved and let change 
the cost of the ticket. The inclusion of some dominant alternatives in the questionnaire 
allows checking for LC without increasing too much the difficulty level of the task. In 
most of cases dominant pairs are excluded from questionnaires on the ground that they 
do not provide any additional information about preferences.  
6. Results. 
The occurrence of inconsistency is verified for 105 respondents (table 3), while one 
third of the choices reflects lexicographic preferences and cannot be checked for LC. 
Lexicographic preferences characterise those individuals who always chose the cheapest 
option or the most expansive one in all nine couples of alternatives. The share of 
travellers who passed the LC test is much higher compared with the result (24.5 per cent) 
for train commuters in Saeleminide (2002). 
 
Results for the estimation of VOT are reported in table 4. Here, as common practice in 
transportation appraisals, the whole sample (407 respondents) enters the model of 
specification of the utility function, without considering the positive or negative result 
of the LC test. Two models have been estimated. In the first one the observable part of 
the utility is assumed to be linear with respect of travel time and cost, as in the example 
in section 3. In the second model we added some individual characteristics in the 
estimated utility function. 
 
Table 4 shows how the VOT derived by considering the whole sample is about 13.08 
euro per hour, a value slightly lower with respect to other studies in our country 
(Cherchi 2003) and to the values suggested for Italy by UNITE (2001). The inclusion of 
individual characteristics does not change WTP estimations. Travelling for work 
reasons has a negative influence on utility, while concerning wealth we observe that the 
higher the income the higher the disutility of travel. The first column of table 6 shows 
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how WTP differs between different categories of travellers: as expected VOT is higher 
for those who travel for work reasons and for respondents who declared a net income 
greater than 20.000 euro per year. 
 
The same procedure has been applied on a restricted sample, comprehensive of those 
respondents who passed the LC test. Results are summarised in table 5. Compared with 
the results summarised in table 4, the VOT for the restricted sample is lower and equal 
to 12.34 euro per hour. This result is consistent with the evidence found by Forster and 
Mourato (2003), Saeleminide (2002) and holds also with other data sets (TRT, 2001). 
This overall effect is due to the increase of the relative weight of lexicographic choices 
in our sample. As we said, about 30.7 per cent of respondents always chose the cheapest 
(and slowest) option or the most expensive (and fastest) one. A strong majority (85 
individuals out of 125) are in the first group, i.e. they preferred the most affordable 
scenario in all nine choice situations. Then, by refusing the second option in choice 2 
(table 8), which is the most convenient one offered in the questionnaire, they declared a 
WTP for travel time lower than 8.6 euro/hour. Hence, if we drop from the sample all the 
observations which violate the LC test, the proportion of individuals characterised by 
the lowest VOT increases. 
 
This effect is shown in table 6, where the VOT for some specific groups of individuals 
is summarised. The exclusion of inconsistent SP has a stronger effect (about -10 per 
cent) on the WTP estimations for non-work trips and for travellers who declared a net 
income lower than 20.00 euro. This is due to the fact that in these categories a large 
share of respondents always chose the cheapest travel option.  
 
Table 6 shows how the variation in VOT estimates between the full sample and the 
restricted one is significant. Such a difference provides important implications for CBA 
appraisals. In this particular case, the exclusion of inconsistent choices leads to lower 
estimates of benefits rising from reductions in travel time. It is not clear whether the 
exclusion of inconsistent choices in the model estimation is justified or not.  
 
On the one hand, the inclusion allows7 for violation of preference relations. This can 
leads to distorted evaluations of time, since some of the respondents were not able to 
express their preferences through the questionnaire. Hence, SP are not good substitutes 
for RP methods8.  
 
On the other hand, the exclusion of irrational choices could lead to self selection biases9. 
If the tendency to answer illogically depends on some observable factors, such as age, 
education or income, the use of a restricted sample could imply that the preferences of a 
certain category of respondent are not taken into account in the WTP estimation.  
 
Table 7 shows the results of our attempt to investigate the relationship between 
inconsistent choices and individual characteristics. Two logit models have been 
estimated, the first one (A) includes the full sample, whilst in the second (B) 
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lexicographic choices have been excluded. The strongest result is the one concerning 
the age of respondents: younger people are less likely to choose inconsistently. 
Considering model A, a shift from the minimum value of age to the maximum one 
implies an increase in the probability of failing the LC test of about 35 per cent. 
Respondents who are travelling for work reasons tend to choose more inconsistently in 
model A. This evidence could be explained by the assumption that people who travel 
for non-work reason are more relaxed and then they can pay more attention to the 
questionnaire. However this result is not confirmed in model B. 
Respondents who chose the train because they find it somehow “better” (cheaper, faster, 
safer) compared with other travel options are more likely to pass the LC test. 
Finally, a relation between travellers’ satisfaction and probability of test failure has been 
found: the higher the satisfaction with punctuality the lower the probability of choosing 
inconsistently. Again, as an explanation we could assume that unsatisfied respondents 
are not really interested in answering the questionnaire, since they think that 
hypothetical reductions in travel time would be defeated by the inefficiency of the 
service.   
 
Results showed in table 7 do not confirm the evidence from Saeleminide (2002), where 
the only statistically significant variable was the level of education10.  
 
Figure 3 reports the BN resulting from the estimation described in the methodological 
chapter. As we said, the package applied in this analysis does not allow mixed datasets. 
Hence, the unique continuous variable from our survey (age of respondents) has been 
recoded into four categories: under 35, 36-48 years, 49-60 years and over 60. 
 
The network combines background information with a learning procedure generated 
using the Hill Climbing algorithm, a score based method implemented in the library 
bnlearn. With the expression background information we simply mean that at the 
beginning of the learning procedure we expressly made some trivial assumptions about 
the networks’ structure. For instance, gender and age of the respondents cannot be 
induced by any other variable. As cited above, the library bnlearn implements several 
learning algorithms and we tested our sample on six different algorithms which apply 
both constraint-based and score-based methods. 
 
Results from the logit estimations are confirmed, but the analysis of the BN provides 
some extra evidence about the connections among variables. Logical consistency 
(LOGCONS) is directly influenced by the age of the respondents and the reason of the 
trip (WORK), which allows to distinguish between work trips and leisure journeys.  
Moreover, the age affects logical consistency both directly and indirectly, through the 
reason of the trip. 
 
As we said, each node has a conditional probability table attached, which describes the 
connection between the children node (here, logical consistency) and its fathers (age 
and reason of the trip). The parameters of node LOGCONS are reported in table 8. The 
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probability to answer inconsistently conditioned on age is higher for elderly who travel 
for non-work reasons compared with other age categories and with those who declared 
to travel for work. However, we have to keep in mind that the reason of the trip is 
indirectly influenced (through the level of education, EDU) by the age of the 
respondents. 
7.Conclusions. 
In this paper a test for LC has been developed on a survey of train travellers.  
 
In general, the issue of LC in SP analysis is still largely unknown especially in choice 
experiment studies where, very often, the design of the surveys does not allow for 
consistency tests. This is mainly due to the high cost of this kind of surveys, which 
increases with respect of the number of questions and the dimension of the sample.  
 
With respect to previous literature, the definition of inconsistency was much less 
restrictive. Moreover, the choice situations proposed in the SP exercise are characterised 
by only two attributes (travel time and cost), in order to reduce the complexity of the 
task. 
 
Results show that, even using less constraining assumptions, a significant number of 
respondents (25.80 per cent) did not choose according to our LC test. The inclusion of 
illogical answers in the WTP valuation leads to an overestimation of the VOT.  
 
It is doubtful whether this exclusion is correct or not, since it could imply an under-
representation in the sample of certain groups of individuals which find more difficult to 
reveal their preferences through a questionnaire. In our case, the tendency to choose 
inconsistently seems to be positively related with the age of respondents. 
 
This result is confirmed by an analysis conducted through Bayesian Networks. This 
methodology shows how the age of respondents has both a direct and an indirect effect 
on logical consistency. Elderly find more difficult to correctly report their preferences 
and the same holds for those who are travelling for non-work reasons. The indirect 
effect of age acts because individuals in the highest age group are more likely to work 
for non-trip reasons. 
 
Finally, an issue which merits further research is the presence of lexicographic choices 
in SP studies. As we have seen, a large share of respondents (30.7 per cent) always 
chose the cheapest or the most expensive travel alternative. Such behaviour, which is 
recurrent in this kind of surveys (Saeleminide, 2002), could be explained by very low 
(or very high) WTP but also by assuming respondents’ strategic behaviour. For example, 
if they are worried about an increase in train fares they could have an incentive to 
underestimate their VOT. Considering our sample, no evidence has been found about a 
relationship between this kind of choices and individual characteristics. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 SP techniques can be split in four categories:  
choice experiments: respondents have to choose between two or more alternatives; 
contingent ranking: respondents are asked to rank a series of alternatives; 
contingent rating: respondents are asked to score alternative scenarios; 
paired comparisons: respondents have to score pairs of scenarios on similar scale. 
It is doubtful that two last methods are able to provide welfare consistent estimates (OECD, 2006). 
2 As pointed out by Kroes e Shelron (1988), RP studies are often characterised by strong correlations 
between explanatory variables of interesting (particularly travel time and cost). These make it difficult to 
estimate model parameters reflecting the proper trade-offs ratios. Moreover, RP preference methods 
cannot be used in a direct way to evaluate demand under conditions which do not yet exist. Finally, they 
require that the explanatory variables can be expressed in “objective” or “engineering” units; therefore 
they are normally restricted to primary service variables (such as journey time and cost) and can in 
practice rarely be used to evaluate the impact of changes in secondary travel variables (such as seat design 
and station facilities). 
3 See Bouffioux (2002) for a survey on choice experiments design techniques. 
4 These and other forms of bias response have been classified by Bonsall (1985). 
5 Only travellers who bought a full price ticket (8 euro) have been interviewed. 
6 Dominance: one alternative is said to dominate a second when it is at least as good as the second. 
Rank consistency: if a respondent is asked to rank options A,B,C,D in the first question and options 
A,B,E,F in the second question, rank consistency requires that a respondent who prefers A over B in the 
first question continues to do so in the second question. 
Transitivity: if a respondent expressed a preference for A over B in the first question and for B over C 
elsewhere, he should not express a preference for option C over A in any other question. 
7 At least with the definition of dominance used in this study. 
8 If we assume that people would always choose consistently in a real context, which is not always the 
case. 
9 A self selection biased is already present in SP studies since some people accept the interview and some 
others refuse. No evidence exists, at least in economic literature, about the relationship between the 
tendency to accept the interview and social-economics parameters.  
10 In Saeleminide (2002) the survey used for the regression of inconsistent choices is not the same as in 
the VOT experiment.  
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Appendix. 
 
Table 1. Does it exist a minimum amount of time that I should offer you, in order to convince you 
to buy a more expensive ticket with respect to the one you bought today? 
 
 
Frequency Percentage 
Cumul. Perc. 
10 minutes 7 1.64  
15 min. 27 6.56 1.64 
20 min. 100 24.59 8.20 
25 min. 33 8.20 32.79 
30 min. 135 33.17 40.99 
45 min. 25 6.56 74.16 
50 min. 5 1.23 80.72 
60 min. 7 1.64 81.95 
No idea 67 16.39 83.59 
Total 407 100,00 100,00 
 
Table 2. If it exists, how much is the maximum amount of money that you would be willing to pay 
in exchange for a time saving? 
 
 Frequency Percentag
e 
2 euro 13 3.86 
2.5 euro 2 0.59 
3 euro 39 11.59 
4 euro 33 9.65 
5 euro 46 13.52 
6 euro 26 7.72 
7 euro 14 4.12 
8 euro 33 9.65 
9 euro 21 6.18 
10 euro 13 3.86 
12 euro 2 0.59 
15 euro 7 1.93 
No idea 53 15.45 
Answer in % of the current ticket 
price 
38 11.18 
Total 340 100,00 
 
Table 3. Number of respondents who chose inconsistently. 
 
 Frequenc
y 
Percentag
e 
Inconsistent choices 105 25.80 
Lexicographic choices 125 30.71 
Consistent and not lexicographic choices 177 43.49 
Total 407 100.00 
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Table 4. Valuation of travel time on the whole sample (407 respondents). 
 
+-----------------------------------------------+| Discrete choice (multinomial logit) model || Maximum Likelihood Estimates |
| Dependent variable Choice || Weighting variable None || Number of observations 3663 || Iterations completed 5 || Log likelihood function -2231.005 |
| R2=1-LogL/LogL* Log-L fncn R-sqrd RsqAdj || No coefficients -2538.998 0.121 0.120 || Constants only -2394.229 0.068 0.067 || Chi-squared[ 2] = 326.448 || Prob [ chi squared > value ] = 0.000 |
| Response data are given as ind. choice. || Number of obs.= 3663, skipped 0 bad obs. |
+-----------------------------------------------+
+---------+---------------+-----------------+--------+---------+|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z] |
+---------+---------------+-----------------+--------+---------+
K 0.341 0.057 5.973 0.000
BTIME -0.077 0.005 -16.320 0.000
BCOST -0.353 0.021 -16.725 0.000
VOT= (BTIME/ BCOST)*60 = 13.08 euro/hour
 
+-----------------------------------------------+
| Discrete choice (multinomial logit) model || Maximum Likelihood Estimates || Dependent variable Choice || Weighting variable None || Number of observations 3663 |
| Iterations completed 5 || Log likelihood function -2132.249 || R2=1-LogL/LogL* Log-L fncn R-sqrd RsqAdj || No coefficients -2538.998 0.160 0.158 || Constants only -2394.229 0.109 0.107 |
| Chi-squared[ 8] = 523.960 || Prob [ chi squared > value ] = 0.000 || Response data are given as ind. choice. || Number of obs.= 3663, skipped 0 bad obs. |
+-----------------------------------------------+
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z] |
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+
K 1.410 0.290 4.861 0.000
BTIME -0.082 0.005 -16.677 0.000
BCOST -0.374 0.022 -17.092 0.000
BINCOME -0.203 0.020 -10.210 0.000
BAGE 0.008 0.003 2.402 0.016
BWORK -0.232 0.085 -2.742 0.006
BEDU -0.038 0.069 -0.544 0.586
BFEMALE -0.078 0.075 -1.040 0.298
BFREQ -0.116 0.045 -2.590 0.010
 
VOT= (BTIME/ BCOST)*60 = 13.09 euro/hour 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5. Valuation of travel time on the “clean” sample (311 respondents). 
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+---------------------------------------------+| Discrete choice (multinomial logit) model |
| Maximum Likelihood Estimates || Dependent variable Choice || Weighting variable None || Number of observations 2727 || Iterations completed 5 |
| Log likelihood function -1631.251 || R2=1-LogL/LogL* Log-L fncn R-sqrd RsqAdj || No coefficients -1890.212 0.137 0.136 || Constants only -1803.763 0.096 0.095 || Chi-squared[ 2] = 345.024 |
| Prob [ chi squared > value ] = .000 || Response data are given as ind. choice. || Number of obs.= 2727, skipped 0 bad obs. |
+---------------------------------------------+
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+
|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z] |
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+
K 0.139 0.065 2.127 0.033
BTIME -0.089 0.006 -15.781 0.000
BCOST -0.435 0.025 -17.117 0.000
VOT= (BTIME/ BCOST)*60 = 12.34 euro/hour
 
 
+---------------------------------------------+| Discrete choice (multinomial logit) model || Maximum Likelihood Estimates || Dependent variable Choice |
| Weighting variable None || Number of observations 2727 || Iterations completed 5 || Log likelihood function -1513.341 || R2=1-LogL/LogL* Log-L fncn R-sqrd RsqAdj |
| No coefficients -1890.212 0.199 0.197 || Constants only -1803.763 0.161 0.158 || Chi-squared[ 8] = 580.845 || Prob [ chi squared > value ] = 0.000 || Response data are given as ind. choice. |
| Number of obs.= 2727, skipped 0 bad obs. |
+---------------------------------------------+
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |b/St.Er.|P[|Z|>z] |
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+
K 1.723 0.353 4.873 0.000
BTIME -0.098 0.006 -16.294 0.000
BCOST -0.477 0.027 -17.635 0.000
BINCOME -0.265 0.024 -11.196 0.000
BAGE 0.015 0.004 3.591 0.000
BWORK -0.206 0.101 -2.040 0.041
BEDU -0.167 0.085 -1.960 0.050
BFEMALE -0.058 0.088 -0.657 0.511
BFREQ -0.165 0.053 -3.119 0.002
 
VOT= (BTIME/ BCOST)*60 = 12.34 euro/hour
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6. VOT estimation for some categories of respondents. Values in euro/hour. 
Estimated model: 
cos costime tV K time tβ β= + +  
 
 Full sample “Clean” sample ∆ 
Work trips 15.57 15.10 -3.01% 
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Non-work trips 11.07 9.96 -10.03% 
Income lower than 20.000 9.96 9.32 -10.73% 
Income higher than 20.000 18.57 17.80 -4.15% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7. Logistic regression of inconsistence choices as a function of socio-economic variables in 
SP exercise (consistent choices=0, inconsistent choices=1). 
 
 (A) (B) 
VARIABLES   
   
Age 0.031*** 0.045*** 
 (0.010) (0.013) 
Female 0.035 -0.129 
 (0.249) (0.285) 
Education -0.183 -0.366 
 (0.212) (0.252) 
Income -0.020 -0.103 
 (0.063) (0.076) 
Work trip -0.497* -0.488 
 (0.280) (0.309) 
Freq. > 3 journeys 0.110 0.181 
 (0.348) (0.376) 
Evaluation of travel alternatives 
(yes) -0.048 -0.318 
 (0.258) (0.295) 
Reason of the travel choice            
(1 if train is faster, cheaper or safer 
than other options) 
0.456* 0.491* 
 (0.247) (0.283) 
Perceived quality -0.109* -0.175** 
 (0.059) (0.072) 
Economic value of delays 0.014 0.047 
 (0.046) (0.051) 
Constant -1.135 0.190 
 (1.023) (1.196) 
   
Log-likelihood -217.47 -163.03 
Chi-squared 29.80 42.45 
Observations 407 279 
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Figure 3. Bayesian Network. 
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Table 8. Parameters of node LOGCONS. Conditional probability table. 
 
Work = work   
Logical consistency Age Age Age Age 
Consistent 0.875 0.773 0.800 0.846 
Inconsistent 0.125 0.227 0.200 0.154 
     
Work= nowork   
Logical consistency     
Consistent 0.714 0.822 0.722 0.404 
Inconsistent 0.286 0.178 0.278 0.596 
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Table 9. Structure of the questionnaire and descriptive statistics. 
 
 
 Absolute 
number % 
Gender (FEMALE)  Male 239 58.72 
  Female 168 41.28 
Reason for the trip (WORK)    
  Work trip 191 46.93 
  Non work trip 216 53.07 
How many times in a month do you travel on this rail 
line? (FREQ) 
   
  Less than one 177 43.49 
  Between 1 and 3 158 38.82 
  Between 3 and 5 41 10.07 
  More than five 31 7.62 
Age (AGE)     
  Less than 30 99 24.32 
  Between 31 and 45 150 36.86 
  Between 46 an 60 109 26.78 
  Over 60 49 12.04 
Education level (EDUC)    
  Elementary school 1 0.25 
  Junior high school 27 6.63 
  Senior high school 170 41.77 
  University 209 51.35 
Have you ever evaluated costs and benefits of other 
travel options (car, bus, etc.) for the trip between Turin 
and Milan? (ALTER) 
   
  Yes 177 43.49 
  No 230 56.51 
Why did you choose the railway? (REASON)    
  It is cheaper compared with other options 93 22.85 
  It is faster compared with other options 17 4.18 
  It is safer compared with other options 49 12.04 
  I do not like to travel by car 52 12.78 
  I do not have a car 71 17.44 
  I like to travel by train / it is more 
comfortable compared with other options 
125 30.71 
Net yearly income (INC)    
  Less than 5.000 47 11.55 
  Between 5.000 and 10.000 46 11.30 
  Between 10.000 and 15.000 57 14.00 
  Between 15.000 and 20.000 71 17.44 
  Between 20.000 and 25.000 63 15.48 
  Between 25.000 and 30.000 44 10.81 
  Between 30.000 and 40.000 38 9.34 
  Between 40.000 and 50.000 14 3.44 
  Between 50.000 and 70.000 17 4.18 
  More than 70.000 10 2.46 
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 Absolute 
number % 
How do you judge the quality of the service in terms of 
punctuality? (SATISFACTION) 
   
  1 (very bad) 4 0.98 
  2 20 4.91 
  3 33 8.11 
  4 33 8.11 
  5 47 11.55 
  6 77 18.92 
  7 84 20.64 
  8 81 19.90 
  9 16 3.93 
  10 (excellent) 12 2.95 
Do you consider train delays as an economic damage?    
(VALDELAY)  1 (severe damage) 2 0.49 
  2 21 5.16 
  3 43 10.57 
  4 20 4.91 
  5 42 10.32 
  6 46 11.30 
  7 27 6.63 
  8 33 8.11 
  9 39 9.58 
  10 (not at all) 134 32.92 
     
Have you ever tried to evaluate the damage in monetary 
terms? 
   
  Yes   
  No   
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Stated preference exercise. 
 
 Choice 1 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Travel time 1h 30 1h 15 
Price 8 euro 12.30 euro 
 Choice 2 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Travel time 1h 45 1h 15 
Price 8 euro 12.30 euro 
 Choice 3 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Travel time 1h 30 1h 15 
Price 8.50 euro 15.80 euro 
 Choice 4 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Travel time 1h 30 1h 15 
Price 8.50 euro 13.50 euro 
 Choice 5 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Travel time 1h 40 1h 20 
Price 8.50 euro 13.50 euro 
 Choice 6 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Travel time 1h 45 1h 15 
Price 8.50 euro 15.80 euro 
 Choice 7 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Travel time 1h 45 1h 15 
Price 8.50 euro 13.50 euro 
 Choice 8 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Travel time 1h 20 1h 40 
Price 12.30 euro 8 euro 
 Choice 9 
 Scenario 1 Scenario 2 
Travel time 1h 40  1h 20 
Price 8.50 euro 15.80 euro 
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Consumers’ satisfaction and quality: evidence from a 
cross country comparison about railway transport 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract. In the last decades several surveys have been conducted in order to observe how 
consumers’ satisfaction with Services of General Interest SGI) differs across EU countries. Many 
times survey results are used as surrogate for quality indicators: the more satisfied the users, the 
higher the quality of the service. Whether this procedure is appropriate or not represents the research 
question faced by this paper. In this work we investigate the connections between objective quality 
and self reported satisfaction with rail transport, using Eurobarometer surveys for 2000, 2002 and 
2004. In the same model we include as regressors some individual characteristics of the respondents, 
in order to verify whether the evidence found in previous literature, which links satisfaction and 
socio-demographic features, is confirmed in our context. Moreover, beyond the size of the 
relationship, our purpose consists in understanding how individual characteristics affect perceptions. 
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1. Introduction. 
In the last years the interest for consumers’ experience with Services of General Interest 
(SGI) largely increased. Several surveys have been conducted in order to observe how 
consumers’ satisfaction differs across EU countries. Many times the concepts of 
satisfaction and quality are used interchangeably: the more satisfied the users, the higher 
the quality of the service. But can we really consider them as a single construct? Some 
authors pointed out how, when agents are asked to express a judgement, several sources 
of bias are involved.  
 
Attitudes are based on personal perceptions and evaluations which, in turn, depend on 
several unobservable and subjective factors. Some examples come from the health 
economic literature (McFadden et al., 2005). Each person has a perception of her own 
health status, based on some objective parameters, which can significantly differ, ceteris 
paribus, from the status perceived by another individual.  
 
The same reasoning applies when individuals are required to express a judgement about 
other aspects of their life, such as Services of General Interest (SGI). In particular, his 
work focuses on perceived satisfaction with railway transport. Of course, compared 
with the previous example about self-rated health status, when asked to evaluate their 
satisfaction with rail transport individuals are perfectly aware of the price they paid, of 
coaches’ cleanliness and of all relevant features of the service. However, even in this 
case perception can be affected by individual-specific characteristics, such as income, 
gender, education, but also by group-specific features, social norms etc. (Bertrand and 
Mullainathan, 2001). The issue of interpersonal and cross-cultural incomparability in 
survey research has been identified and studied by many researchers, who developed 
new methods in order to overcome this problem (King and Wand, 2007). 
   
Surveys results are often interpreted as quality benchmarks by policy makers and 
regulators. In the case of railways, poor evidence is available about objective quality of 
the service and surveys are commonly used in order to compare different services or 
countries. For example, the analysis of Eurobarometer Special Issues n.53 (2000), n.58 
(2002) and n.62 (2004) provides us the picture represented in figure 1. Asked about 
satisfaction with price and quality, respondents from fourteen European countries 
expressed their opinion. The picture represents the departure from the mean of quality 
and price satisfaction in each country. The interpretation of this scenario usually leads to 
two conclusions. Taking Italy as reference, we could infer that: 
1. in Italy railway transport quality is low; 
2. transport quality is lower in Italy than in other countries (for instance Denmark or 
Greece). 
 
The first statement assumes consumers’ satisfaction to be a good predictor of objective 
quality. The second conclusion assumes that perceptions are not only good predictors of 
quality but that they are also fully comparable among different groups of individuals.  
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The research question pursued in the following lines concerns the verification of these 
two hypotheses and the investigations of  the effects of individual and group-specific 
characteristics on perceived satisfaction. 
 
Here we analyse the results from three Eurobarometer Issues (2000, 2002, and 2004), 
which include more than 26,000 interviews about satisfaction with rail transport in EU 
countries. In our model we include as predictors for satisfaction both individual 
characteristics and railways indicators. The latter should capture the most relevant 
differences in railway services across Europe.  
 
A final section is devoted to a brief discussion about the problem of endogeneity of 
some among our regressors. A new model is estimated, using the results from another 
survey, conducted on the regional train between Turin and Milan in June and July 2008. 
2. The data. 
Eurobarometer surveys. Since 1973, the European Commission has been monitoring the 
evolution of public opinion in the Member States, thus helping the preparation of 
reports, and the evaluation of different policies. Eurobarometer surveys collect a large 
amount of information about individuals’ actual attitudes, such as vote intention or 
media use, and their satisfaction with life in general and some specific issues, such as 
government policies or public services. 
 
Satisfaction with SGI have been widely investigated: Eurobarometer Special Issues n. 
47 in 1997, n. 53 in 2000, n.58 in 2002, n.62 in 2004 and n.63 in 2005 focus on the 
quality perceived by consumers about the supply of services such as gas, electricity, 
telecommunications and transportation. Here we focus on individuals’ satisfaction with 
rail transport between cities, which has been studied in all Eurobarometer volumes 
summarised above. 
 
In 1997 and 2005 surveys, question wording slightly differs compared with other 
Special Issues. Then, the analysis deals with 2000, 2002 and 2004 data, which are fully 
comparable1. Eurobarometer Special Issues n. 53, n. 58 and n.62 present one question 
about both price and quality satisfaction. In the first case, respondents are asked to 
express their opinion about prices, by choosing a category in a three point scale: three if 
they find the service to be “fair” priced, two when the price is judged as “unfair” and 
one if it is “excessive”. Similarly, the quality of the rail transportation service can be 
defined according to the following scale: four if it is defined as “very good”, two if it is 
just “fairly good”, three if the quality is “fairly bad” and four for “very bad” quality. 
Figure 1 reports the average values for satisfaction with both price and quality, obtained 
by pooling the three samples. Countries in the low-left corner are characterised by lower 
average levels of satisfaction, while the opposite holds for the nations in the top-right 
one. Descriptive statistics about price and quality satisfaction are summarised in table 1. 
 78
 
Eurobarometer surveys provide us with a large amount of information about 
respondents’ characteristics, such as age, gender, education, etc. Unfortunately some of 
these features are not available for all volumes. Then, we run our model separately on 
each dataset, in order to be able to include and investigate the effect of these issue-
specific indicators.  
 
Figure 1. Departures from the mean of price and quality satisfaction in EU 
countries. 
 
Source: Eurobarometer Special Issues n.53 in 2000, n.58 in 2002, n.62 in 2004 
 
 
Macroeconomic indicators. The inclusion of macroeconomic indicators is based on the 
assumption that the economic and social environment in which individuals act has an 
effect on their perception of satisfaction. For example, it seems reasonable to guess a 
negative relation between high unemployment rates and satisfaction. Other researchers 
(Fiorio et al., 2007) found significant results concerning GDP, GDP growth rate and 
employment rates. Usually macroeconomic indicators are country-specific. Since 
Eurobarometer surveys classify respondents based on their region of residence (at 
NUTS II level) we use as a source for macroeconomic indicators the Eurostat Regional 
Statistics database, in order to verify whether, compared with previous evidence, the 
inclusion of regional (instead of national) data improves the significance of our results. 
Our predictors comprehend net disposable income of household expressed in PPP, the 
yearly change in disposable income, population density and unemployment rates. 
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Moreover, the suicide rate per 100.000 inhabitants (at NUTS II level as well) has been 
included in our models, based on the evidence found by Koivumaa-Honkanen et al. 
(2001) which links higher suicide rates with lower levels of satisfaction. 
 
Railways indicators. As we said in the first paragraph, we add to individual 
characteristics and macroeconomic indicators seven regressors, representative for some 
features of railway transport which are supposed to influence individuals’ preferences.  
 
Following FitzRoy and Smith (1995), who studied the demand for rail transport in EU 
countries, we measure rail fares as passenger revenue per passenger-kilometer, 
expressed in euros and converted to a common currency using purchasing parity 
exchange rates. Descriptive statistics are reported in figure 2. Yearly change in fares 
measures the growth rate of the previous indicator.  
 
Again, according to FitzRoy and Smith (1995), the demand for rail transport can be 
defined as passenger-kilometer per capita. Figure 5 in the appendix shows some 
evidence from EU countries. 
 
The predictor “accidents” represents the number of fatalities in railway accidents, 
without any weight for countries’ population. The underlying assumption is that country 
size does not matter since fatal accidents involving railways have a wide echo on 
newspapers and other media. Figure 4 reports the average number of passengers killed 
in railway accidents between 2000 and 2004. “Monopoly” is a dummy variable equal to 
one if a unique rail transport provider operates in the country and equal to zero if in the 
market acts more than one provider. 
All these variables are at country level, as regional data are not available. In most cases 
our source is the World Bank’s Railways Database, other sources are summarised with 
more details in table 7. 
 
Finally, we built two predictors for the supply of rail transport and motorways, which 
are railways’ main competitor. In this case data are available for NUTS II regions and 
the regressors are defined as the ratio between the length of railways (or motorways) 
and the region area. Figure 3 reports some data about the supply of railways and 
motorways at country level. In general, the former have a higher weight with respect to 
motorways in less developed countries. 
3. The empirical model. 
Since respondents have been asked to state their satisfaction based on a three (in the 
case of price) and four (for quality) points scale, answers are only ordinally comparable. 
In other words we do not know what the relative distance between satisfaction answers 
is, but we assume that all individuals share the same interpretation of each possible 
answer. 
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The true level of satisfaction can be represented as a continuous, unobserved latent 
variable *Y , which is equal to: 
*Y x eβ= +  
where the random disturbance term has a logistic distribution. Instead of *Y we observe 
Y , our ordinal variable. We can think at Y  as a collapsed version of *Y , whose value 
depends on whether or not the continuous variable *Y crossed a particular, unknown, 
threshold ( 1α <…< jα ...< Mα ): 
0iY =   if   
*
1iY α≤  
1iY =   if    
*
1 2iYα α≤ ≤  
                       . 
                       . 
                       . 
iY M=   if    
*
iY > Mα  
where M is the number of categories of the ordinal dependent variable. 
Then, we can estimate the probability that Y will take on any particular value through 
standard ordered logistic regression: 
 
( iP Y >
exp( )
) ( ) , 1,2,..., 1
1 exp( )
j i
j i
x
j g x j M
x
α β
β
α β
+
= = = −
 + + 
                                 (1) 
 
Note that ordered logit models are multi-equational models: they correspond to a series 
of binary logistic regressions where categories are combined. For example, if we want 
to analyse satisfaction with prices, which is coded as a categorical variable with three 
outcomes, two separate equations are estimated: the first one compares one category 
(e.g. the most positive judgements) with a combination of the other two, while the 
second equation contrasts categories 1 and 2 versus the third one. As a consequence, we 
get for each predictor a number of coefficients equal to  1M − .  
 
However the model (1) is based on the assumption that the relationship between each 
pair of outcome groups is the same. In other words, the proportional odds assumption 
forces the coefficients to be the same. Since this hypothesis is often violated, we test in 
our models its validity. 
When the assumption is rejected, we estimate another model, by relaxing the 
proportional odds hypothesis for a subset of predictors. As a first step we identify those 
regressors for which the assumption holds and, as a second step, we estimate a new 
model where all other predictors’ coefficients are allowed to change for each pair of 
outcome groups.  
Following Williams (2007) we run a new model which is a hybrid between the one 
described by (1) and the generalised ordered logit model: 
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( iP Y >
exp( )
) ( ) , 1,2,..., 1
1 exp( )
j i j
j
j i j
x
j g x j M
x
α β
β
α β
+
= = = −
 + + 
                              (2) 
 
where the Betas are not the same for each value of j. 
 
As controls we use a set of individual characteristics. Some of them (gender, age, 
education, marital status, occupational group, political views) are available for all 
Eurobarometer Special Issues, while some questions have been asked only in some 
Eurobarometer waves. Since it is interesting to investigate the relation between this 
second group of variables (such as life quality, income, community size) and 
satisfaction we replicate our analysis on each sample. Moreover, this procedure allows 
us to compare patterns of satisfaction between EU Old Member States (OMS) and New 
Member States (NMS), which have been included in the survey only from 2004. In this 
case we estimate two models: in the first one we take as reference the group of OMS 
and we include country dummies for all NMS, while in the second model we do the 
opposite.  
 
Finally, we pool together the three samples in order to check the consistency of previous 
results and to include all country dummies for OMS, taking Italy as reference.  
4. Results. 
The presentation of the results is organised as follows. Tables 2-6 in the appendix report 
the estimations for each Eurobarometer survey (2000, 2002 and 2004) and the results 
from the pooled sample (table 5 and 6). Here some evidence is summarised, pointing 
out the main differences among the estimated models. 
 
Individual characteristics. Respondents’ gender seems to affect satisfaction, especially 
with prices. Females tend to be less satisfied than males, and this result is consistent 
across all samples, with the exception of 2000. Considering the pooled sample and 
holding all other variables constant, the odds of having a more negative opinion about 
ticket prices are 1.14 times larger for women than men. 
 
The effect of age on satisfaction with both price and quality of the service is significant 
and consistent across all samples. The sign is positive, which means that elderly are 
more likely to be satisfied compared with younger people, even if the dimension of the 
coefficient is rather small. If we consider the pooled sample, the coefficient of age on 
price satisfaction is about 0.008. Translated in terms of changes in probabilities (not 
reported in table 6), this result shows how, shifting from the minimum value of age (15 
years) to the maximum (99), the probability of defining the fares as “excessive” reduces 
of about 4 per cent, while the probability of finding them “fair” increases of about 15 
per cent.  
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Regressors about respondents’ occupation do not show clear and strong results even if 
we could have assumed some effects on satisfaction with train transport. For example, 
one would expect a positive relation between price satisfaction and the dummies for 
students and retired people, since reduced price tickets are often available for these two 
categories of travellers. This hypothesis is not strongly supported by the evidence. 
Students seem to be more satisfied with prices in 2000 and 2002, while the result is not 
confirmed in 2004. The coefficient about quality satisfaction is positive as well, but 
weakly significant. Unexpectedly, the strongest result for retired people concerns their 
feelings about quality. They seem to be more likely to be satisfied with this feature of 
the service but, compared with the other occupational groups, they apparently do not 
judge more generously the level of fares (with the exception of 2000). Evidence arising 
from the inclusion of dummy variables for the other professional categories is not 
marked by consistency across the samples.  
 
Political views apparently matter, as center and right voters tend to be more satisfied 
with both price and quality. Results become more significant and coefficients’ 
dimension is larger when data do not allow us to control for income at individual level 
(tables 2 and 3 vs tables 4 and 5). 
 
As we could expect, those who personally made a complaint in the last two months, 
either to a complaint-handling body or to the service provider are less likely to give 
positive feedbacks about their satisfaction. Referring to the pooled sample, the 
probability of defining the price as “fair” decreases of about 15.6 per cent for the 
travellers who made a complaint as opposed to those who did not. The same holds for 
quality satisfaction, even if this time the proportional odds assumption is rejected. The 
generalised ordered logit estimation shows (table 6) that the effect of complaining is 
particularly large for the second outcome category, which is the probability of finding 
the quality “fairly bad”.  
 
Keeping all other variables constant, respondents who finished full-time education up to 
fourteen years (low education) seem to be less satisfied than the others, at least in 2004. 
This result is weakly confirmed for 2002, while it is not statistically significant in 2000. 
The same reasoning applies to separated and divorced people.  
 
Predictors not constant across all surveys. As we said before, some individual 
characteristics are not available for all Eurobarometer issues but they could be relevant 
in order to understand changes in our dependent variable. Respondents have been asked 
about their life satisfaction in 2000 and 2004. The rationale behind the inclusion of this 
variable is that people satisfied with their life are more likely to be satisfied also with 
other collateral components of their existence, such as railways transport. Even if the 
question wording slightly differs between the two surveys2, the evidence is very similar 
and it supports our assumption. In our models the regressor for life satisfaction is a 
dummy variable equal to one for those respondents who defined themselves “fairly” or 
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“very satisfied” with their life3. Results in tables 1 and 4 show how the positive relation 
between life satisfaction and the probability of being pleased with railway transport is 
relevant especially for prices. Switching from unsatisfied interviewees to satisfied ones, 
the probability to define fares as “fair” increases of about 11 per cent.  
 
Expectations about future life quality (available only for 2004 4 ) matter as well: 
optimism is related with positive opinions about both price and quality of the service. 
 
Two questions, in 2000 and 2002 surveys, investigate individual wealth asking each 
respondent to choose his category of income out of a list and to state whether he is the 
person who contributes most to the household income or not. Two variables in our 
models try to capture any effect linked to individual wealth. Weak evidence can be 
observed in 2000. Respondents have been split into income quartiles: shifting from the 
lowest to the highest one, the probability of defining ticket prices as “fair” increases of 
about 4.3 per cent. However, any conclusion has to be based on the presumption that 
people do not lie when asked to reveal their income, which sounds quite optimistic. 
 
The size of the community is significant in 2002 but not in 2004. A dummy variable 
equal to one identifies those respondents who live in a big city: apparently they tend to 
be more satisfied with quality than the others, which seems reasonable since in large 
towns transport networks are more developed compared with rural areas. This 
interpretation leads us to other two variables which concern the accessibility of the 
service. Those who declared to have difficult access to rail transport (this variable is 
available for all surveys) are definitely less likely to be satisfied compared with the 
respondents who have easy access. In particular, evidence is relevant for quality 
satisfaction, which makes sense because accessibility can be viewed as a component of 
service quality. Keeping all other variables constant to their mean (table 6), the 
probability of being “very satisfied” with quality decreases of about 19 per cent  for 
travellers who have difficult access. The same evidence applies for those who do not 
have access at all. The variable no access is not available for 2004 since for that 
Eurobarometer issue only travellers who have access to the service have been asked 
about their satisfaction. As can be seen for the generalised ordered logit results in table 
6, the effect of having no access is more extreme on lower levels of satisfaction.  
 
Instead of investigating differences between travellers who have access to rail transport 
and those who do not, 2004 data allow us to distinguish between respondents who use 
the train and those who do not. The result is quite trivial: people who travel by train are 
more likely to be satisfied with prices5, but it seems reasonable to assume that those 
who prefer other means of transport do not find particularly convenient to use railways. 
 
Macroeconomic indicators. The first regressor analyses the relationship between 
satisfaction and the average disposable income at NUTS II level. Evidence is consistent 
across all surveys and it suggests a negative effect of the predictor on our dependent 
variables. This could sound somehow counterintuitive, as one could expect a positive 
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connection between wealth and satisfaction, as the one (weakly) observed for the 
income quartile. However, since the wealth indicator reported here refers to regions 
rather than individuals, the negative coefficient can be explained by the hypothesis that 
richest regions are characterised by more developed transport networks. Then, railways 
are in competition with many other travel options and, as a consequence, travellers’ 
judgements are more severe. Yearly change in disposable income seems to be related to 
lower levels of satisfaction as well, but results are not significant in a couple of cases 
(2002, 2004).  
 
Population density does not have any influence on the perception of service quality and 
price fairness.  
 
Respondents who live in regions characterised by higher unemployment rates tend to be 
less satisfied with prices, while the effect on quality satisfaction is not confirmed across 
all Eurobarometer Issues.  
 
Finally, contradictory results are shown for the suicide rate. Based on the literature 
suggesting a negative relation between life satisfaction and suicides, we would expect a 
negative coefficient. However, this hypothesis is not verified, and suicide rates seem to 
be linked to less extremely negative patterns of satisfaction with quality. 
 
Railways indicators.  An increase in fares is likely to reduce perceived satisfaction with 
both price and quality. This effect is consistent across all surveys. In principle, we 
would expect a positive relation between fares and quality satisfaction. However, results 
show the opposite relation: the higher the fares the lower the satisfaction with quality. In 
general, the evidence suggests the occurrence of endogeneity, since prices depend on 
several unobserved factors. Moreover, agents expressed their satisfaction based on the 
price they actually paid, while in our models we are controlling for an average measure 
for fares. This topic is discussed with more details in the second appendix. 
 
Yearly change in fares is associated with lower levels of satisfaction, especially with 
prices. 
 
The number of fatalities (not available in 2004) does not seem to be a powerful 
predictor for satisfaction. We would expect a connection with quality satisfaction but no 
evidence confirms this hypothesis. 
 
Concerning market structure, monopoly is associated with higher levels of satisfaction 
with prices. This result is consistent across all surveys, while the same evidence does 
not apply for quality satisfaction.  
 
The demand for rail transport, defined as per capita passengers-kilometres, is supposed 
to be positively related to consumers’ satisfaction: if travellers choose this mean of 
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transport probably they do like it. However, results show negative coefficients in all 
models but in the pooled sample, where we included country dummies.   
The same conclusions apply for the railways and motorways length. Coefficients 
fluctuate between positive and negative values and any strong deduction can be drawn 
by the inclusion of these regressors in our model.   
 
Country dummies. Country dummies have been included in our models in 2004 and in 
the pooled sample.  
 
As we said, 2004 Eurobarometer Issue allows us to compare NMS with OMS. If we 
include in our  model a dummy variable equal to 1 for NMS instead of country 
dummies the results (not reported in the tables) show that, compared with OMS 
inhabitants, respondents from NMS tend to be less satisfied with both price (coeff. 
about -0.47) and quality (coeff. about -0.94).  
 
Output reported in table 4 allows us to discriminate among NMS. Hungary, Poland and 
Slovakia are the countries characterised by the lowest coefficients for price satisfaction. 
Moreover, the generalised ordered logit estimation warns us about the weakness of our 
results, as the proportional odds assumption is rejected for most of country dummies. 
With the exceptions of Lithuania and Slovenia, NMS respondents tend to be more at the 
lower extreme of price satisfaction (i.e. “excessive”) than OMS people are. The same 
reasoning holds for quality satisfaction, even if this time the proportional odds 
assumption is violated only in two cases.  
 
Pooled sample outcomes, reported in table 6, allow us to analyse the group of OMS 
taking Italy as reference. Again, we can observe how the ordered logit model does not 
represent the best option in order to properly capture country effects. Compared to our 
country, the probability of being satisfied with prices seems to be higher in all other 
nations but Netherlands, Germany and Austria. People from some countries (Spain, 
Portugal, Finland, Sweden and Greece) tend to express less extreme judgements for 
dissatisfaction. 
Concerning quality, all countries’ coefficients are positive, which means that non-italian 
respondents are more likely to report higher levels of satisfaction. As showed by the 
generalised ordered logit results, this time differences do not focus on the lowest 
category but on the higher one. In several countries (Danemark, Ireland, Finland, 
Sweden and Austria) satisfied respondents tend to state their satisfaction more 
generously6 compared with Italians. 
5. Conclusions. 
Results presented in the previous section allow us to draw some conclusions for each 
group of predictors. 
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Considering individual characteristics, the evidence depicted in our models is 
consistent with other literature findings. Fiorio and Florio (2007) focused on 
consumers’ satisfaction with electricity providers across EU countries. They found 
negative connections between satisfaction, respondent’s gender (female) and political 
views (left voters). These results have been confirmed in our work, as well as for the 
weak link between some occupational groups (students, retired) and satisfaction. Other 
researchers (Hall and Dornan, 1990) found robust evidence linking age and satisfaction 
with healthcare services: older patients tend to be more satisfied, as in our analysis. 
Compared with other studies we have been able to include individual life satisfaction, 
which appeared to be one of the most significant predictors for satisfaction with rail 
transport services.  
 
Macroeconomic indicators are in general not strongly significant with two exceptions: 
the disposable income and the unemployment rate. The result concerning income is 
supported by Fiorio and Florio (2007), even if in their study macroeconomic indicators 
were defined at country level. Apparently, the use of regional data does not improve 
findings’ significance. The robustness of these results reduces when we enlarge the 
sample to NMS (2004). 
 
The inclusion of railways indicators provided strong results for the level of fares and 
the structure of the market (monopoly), while in some cases the evidence is somehow 
contradictory (transport networks length) and in some others it is quite weak (demand).  
We have to underline how some relevant features of railway transport have not been 
included in our model due to unavailability of data. Delays, cleanliness, coaches’ 
comfort do matter in determining consumers’ satisfaction. Moreover, our regressor for 
fares captures the relative price of train transport across countries but not across means 
of transportation. For example, motorways are tolled in some nations and free of charge 
in some others. For the latter group, you would expect a negative relation between fares 
and price satisfaction, as the opportunity cost for train transport is higher. However, the 
inclusion of a dummy equal to one for those countries without charged motorways and 
equal to zero for the others did not produce any significant result 7 . This issue is 
discussed in the second appendix, where the same experiment has been replicated on a 
sample of respondents who shared the same travel experience. 
 
Recalling the two hypotheses suggested in the introduction, we can conclude that 
satisfaction is strongly influenced by individual characteristics. Moreover, the 
connection between satisfaction and objective quality seems to be affected by individual 
specific features such as age, gender or occupation. Concerning the comparability of 
patterns of satisfaction among different countries, results show how, after controlling 
for individual characteristics and socio-economic indicators, relevant differences 
characterise each country. These differences involve not only the absolute values of 
satisfaction, but also the way of expressing opinions, which appears more extreme in 
some nations compared with others. Since the country dummies include all the 
unobserved features for which we did not account in the model, this is just a conjecture. 
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However, it is an assumption which merits further research and finds theoretical and 
empirical verification in some recent literature about surveys (King and Wand, 2007). 
  
Notes 
                                                 
1 In 2004 the question wording about price satisfaction differs compared with the other two. However, 
answers can be rearranged in order to be consistent with the other datasets. More in detail, in 2004 
respondents answered two questions about their satisfaction with prices. The first one was: “in general, 
would you say that the price you pay for rail service is affordable, not affordable or excessive?”. The 
second question was: “and in general, would you say that the price you pay for rail services is justified or 
not?”. We rearranged the answers by coding “3” (corresponding to “fair” in 2000 and 2002) for those 
who answered “justified” in the second question, “2” (“unfair” in the other issues) for those who said “not 
justified” in the second question but did not choose “excessive” in the first one. Consequently, we marked 
with “1” those who find the price “not justified” in the second question and “excessive” in the first one. 
2 In 2000 the question was: On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not 
at all satisfied with the life you lead ? In 2004 the question changed as follows: How would you judge the 
current situation in each of the following domains (life quality): very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very 
bad?  
3 In 2004 those who answered “very good” and “fairly good”. 
4 The variable “future life satisfaction” recodes the answers at the following question: according to you, in 
five years, will the situation in each of the following domains (life quality) be much better, somehow 
better, identical, somehow worse, much worse than it is now? Our regressor is a dummy equal to one for 
those who answered “much better” or “somehow better” and for the respondents who said “identical” but 
answered “very good” or “fairly good” in the previous question about the quality of their life. 
5 Only travellers who have access and use the train have been asked about quality satisfaction.  
6 They define themselves “very satisfied” rather than “fairly satisfied”. 
7 We dropped the dummy from the models presented here due to issues of statistical fit. 
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Appendix 1. 
 
 
Price satisfaction is ranked in three categories: 1 (excessive), 2 (unfair) and 3 (fair). 
Quality satisfaction is classified in four classes: 1 very (unsatisfied), 2 (fairly unsatisfied), 3 (fairly satisfied) 
and 4 (very satisfied). 
 
 
Table 1. Price and quality satisfaction across EU countries (pooled sample). 
 Price satisfaction 
 Observations Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Belgium 2,113 2.283 0.760 1 3 
France 1,967 2.389 0.702 1 3 
Netherlands 2,527 2.135 0.723 1 3 
Germany 4,248 2.134 0.669 1 3 
Italy 2,184 2.222 0.735 1 3 
Denmark 2,329 2.623 0.553 1 3 
Ireland 1,972 2.504 0.689 1 3 
United Kingdom 2,833 2.515 0.624 1 3 
Greece 1,995 2.736 0.482 1 3 
Spain 2,231 2.538 0.599 1 3 
Portugal 1,789 2.553 0.569 1 3 
Finland 1,968 2.626 0.507 1 3 
Sweden 2,416 2.524 0.562 1 3 
Austria 2,113 2.283 0.760 1 3 
      
 Quality satisfaction 
 Observations Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Belgium 1,910 3.117 0.774 1 4 
France 1,729 2.945 0.705 1 4 
Netherlands 2,093 2.630 0.799 1 4 
Germany 3,615 2.624 0.781 1 4 
Italy 1,801 2.486 0.761 1 4 
Denmark 2,097 3.296 0.732 1 4 
Ireland 1,911 3.052 0.870 1 4 
United Kingdom 2,515 2.886 0.857 1 4 
Greece 1,746 3.105 0.687 1 4 
Spain 1,853 2.965 0.644 1 4 
Portugal 1,540 2.842 0.611 1 4 
Finland 1,753 3.127 0.649 1 4 
Sweden 2,241 3.183 0.763 1 4 
Austria 1,910 3.117 0.774 1 4 
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Table 2. Satisfaction with railway transportation services, generalised ordered logit reults (coefficients): 
2000. 
 
VARIABLES 
PRICE SATISFACTION QUALITY SATISFACTION 
Generalized ordered logit Generalized ordered logit 
1 2 1 2 3 
 Individual characteristics 
Female -0.074  0.049   
Age 0.009***  0.007***   
Life satisfaction • 0.432***  0.288***   
Low education -0.097  -0.178 0.006 -0.220** 
Separated/divorced -0.049  0.073   
Complaint -0.599***  -0.953***   
Occupational groups:      
Student 0.321**  0.150   
Retired 0.325**  0.056   
Manual worker 0.168  0.059   
Manager 0.091  -0.079   
White collar 0.088  -0.114   
House person 0.021 0.504*** 0.203   
Unemployed 0.151  0.145   
Political views:      
Center 0.010 0.160*** 0.092   
Right 0.039  0.038   
DK/NA 0.085  0.109   
Income contributor • 0.035  0.056   
Income quartile • 0.052*  -0.026   
Difficult access -0.696*** -1.362*** -1.942*** -2.092*** -1.649*** 
No access • -2.034***  -3.225*** -2.012*** -0.930** 
 Macroeconomic indicators 
Disposable income -0.059** -0.005 -0.087**   
Yearly change in disposable 
income 
-0.076** -0.095*** -0.043 -0.021 -0.051* 
Population density 0.000*  0.000   
Unemployment -0.018 -0.014 -0.017 -0.035** -0.082*** 
Suicides 0.049*** 0.017** 0.057***   
 Railways indicators 
Fares -0.121***  -0.115*** -0.126*** -0.065* 
Yearly change in fares 0.024***  0.022** 0.018*** 0.006 
Accidents 0.026* -0.003 0.002   
Monopoly 0.370*** 0.090 -0.745***   
Demand -0.001***  -0.000   
Railways -0.015***  -0.003   
Motorways -0.019***  -0.019***   
      
Constant 4.936*** 2.043*** 5.536*** 3.526*** 0.882* 
Log-likelihood -6,810.844 -8,293.762 
Wald-chi squared 909.26 1,191.67 
Observations 7,973  8,074  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Omitted categories are: “manual worker” (occupational groups), “left” (political views), “easy access”. 
• Variables not constant across all surveys. 
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Table 3. Satisfaction with railway transportation services, generalised ordered logit reults (coefficients): 
2002. 
 
2002 VARIABLES 
PRICE SATISFACTION QUALITY SATISFACTION 
Generalized ordered logit Generalized ordered logit 
1 2 1 2 3 
 Individual characteristics 
Female -0.177***  0.085   
Age 0.009***  0.005***   
Low education -0.196*  0.070   
Separated/divorced 0.100  0.082   
Complaint -0.708***  -0.849*** -1.211*** -0.357 
Community (big city) • -0.083 0.005 0.218**   
Occupational groups:      
Student 0.235*  0.227   
Retired 0.164  0.223 0.263** 0.401*** 
Manual worker -0.080  0.168   
Manager 0.014  0.212 -0.134 0.114 
White collar -0.043  0.238 -0.024 0.145 
House person -0.049  0.234**   
Unemployed -0.066  -0.009 -0.030 0.064 
Political views:      
Center 0.175***  -0.112 0.055 0.244*** 
Right 0.178***  -0.132 0.033 0.275*** 
DK/NA 0.015  0.052   
Income contributor • 0.179 -0.098 0.033   
Income quartile • 0.092** -0.026 0.028   
Difficult access -0.801*** -1.282*** -2.049***   
No access • -1.500***  -2.852*** -2.072*** -1.113*** 
 Macroeconomic indicators 
Disposable income -0.022***  0.003   
Yearly change in disposable 
income 
0.061** -0.018 -0.075***   
Population density -0.000*  -0.000***   
Unemployment -0.056*** -0.058*** 0.021   
Suicides 0.023**  0.050** 0.024** -0.036** 
 Railways indicators 
Fares -0.061**  -0.101** -0.138*** -0.084*** 
Yearly change in fares -0.002  -0.000 -0.014*** -0.032*** 
Accidents 0.019** 0.002 0.018 0.012 -0.006 
Monopoly 0.920*** 0.560*** -0.082 0.301 0.584*** 
Demand -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.000 0.000 0.002*** 
Railways 0.014**  0.011**   
Motorways -0.004  -0.006   
      
Constant 4.106*** 1.615*** 3.568*** 1.939*** -1.868*** 
Log pseudo-likelihood -5,843.865 -7,169.615 
Wald-chi squared 762.01 2,177.75 
Observations 6,926  7,075  
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Omitted categories are: “manual worker” (occupational groups), “left” (political views), “easy access”. 
• Variables not constant across all surveys. 
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Table 4. Satisfaction with railway transportation services, generalised ordered logit reults (coefficients): 
2004. 
 
2004 VARIABLES 
PRICE SATISFACTION QUALITY SATISFACTION 
Generalized ordered logit Generalized ordered logit 
1 2 1 2 3 
 Individual characteristics 
Female -0.125***  -0.100**   
Age 0.007***  0.009***   
Low education -0.090 -0.134** 0.172*   
Separated/divorced -0.177**  -0.064   
Complaint -0.621***  -1.270*** -1.095*** -0.455*** 
Community (big city) • -0.029  0.031   
Occupational groups:      
Student -0.066  0.140   
Retired 0.045  0.414***   
Manual worker 0.058  0.300**   
Manager -0.171  -0.078   
White collar -0.072  0.084   
House person -0.038  0.301**   
Unemployed -0.346***  0.150   
Political views:      
Center 0.137***  0.147**   
Right 0.129**  0.180***   
DK/NA 0.032  0.011   
Life satisfaction • 0.470***  0.233***   
Future life satisfaction • 0.048 0.223*** 0.179**   
Difficult access -0.346*** -0.662*** -1.272***   
Use • 0.139 0.291***    
 Macroeconomic indicators 
Disposable income -0.014  -0.114* 0.001 -0.055 
Yearly change in disposable 
income 
0.031* 0.004 0.007   
Population density 0.000  0.000   
Unemployment 0.017  0.003 0.006 -0.075*** 
Suicides 0.058*** 0.035*** 0.045***   
 Railways indicators 
Fares -0.285*** -0.018 -0.062 -0.122*** -0.070* 
Yearly change in fares -0.062*** -0.019* 0.053** 0.004 -0.032** 
Accidents -0.148 -0.370*** -0.002   
Monopoly -0.172* 0.158*** 0.235*   
Demand -0.000 -0.035*** 0.001   
Railways 0.002  -0.013***   
Motorways 0.018**  -0.013   
 New Member States 
Czech Republic -3.042*** -0.729*** -1.170***   
Hungary -3.964*** -0.650* -1.957***   
Lithuania -0.729  -1.117**   
Poland -2.930*** -0.788*** -2.141*** -1.417*** -0.807** 
Slovakia -3.885*** -1.613*** 0.035 -0.968*** -0.297 
Slovenia -0.708** 0.615*** 0.053   
Constant 6.103*** 0.592 3.962*** 1.237** -0.693 
Log pseudo-likelihood -10,107.401 -6,356.996 
Wald-chi squared 1,474.35 8,955.41 
Observations 11,897  6,479  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Omitted categories are: “manual worker” (occupational groups), “left” (political views), “easy access”.  
• Variables not constant across all surveys. 
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Table 5. Satisfaction with railway transportation services, generalised ordered logit reults (coefficients): 
pooled sample. 
 
VARIABLES 
PRICE SATISFACTION QUALITY SATISFACTION 
Generalized ordered logit Generalized ordered logit 
1 2 1 2 3 
 Individual characteristics 
Female -0.137***  0.025   
Age 0.008***  0.013*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 
Low education -0.130**  -0.005 0.127** 0.108* 
Separated/divorced -0.127***  0.174 0.022 -0.088 
Complaint -0.635***  -0.998*** -1.201*** -0.566*** 
Occupational groups:      
Student 0.094  0.093   
Retired 0.141**  -0.064 0.202*** 0.240*** 
Manual worker -0.038  0.080   
Manager -0.079  -0.067 -0.183** -0.012 
White collar -0.071  -0.048   
House person 0.095  0.025 0.204** 0.266*** 
Unemployed -0.204***  0.079   
Political views:      
Center 0.192***  0.130***   
Right 0.119***  0.050 0.039 0.114** 
DK/NA -0.018 0.086* 0.140* 0.177*** 0.042 
Difficult access -0.611*** -1.198*** -1.922*** -1.916*** -1.493*** 
No access -1.368***  -2.917*** -1.934*** -1.227*** 
Year 2002 0.488*** -0.194** -0.292** -0.080 -0.180** 
Year 2004 0.501*** -0.089 0.100 0.071 -0.222* 
 Macroeconomic indicators 
Disposable income -0.048**  -0.029   
Yearly change in disposable 
income 
-0.001 -0.037*** -0.049*** -0.017 -0.008 
Population density -0.000  -0.000   
Unemployment -0.024**  -0.013   
Suicides -0.007  0.032*** 0.009 -0.011 
 Railways indicators 
Fares -0.010 -0.092*** -0.050**   
Yearly change in fares -0.006**  0.005   
Accidents 0.015* -0.000 -0.007 -0.009 0.002 
Monopoly 0.131***  0.046   
Demand 0.001 0.000 0.001   
Railways -0.003  0.006**   
Motorways -0.001  -0.000   
      
Country dummies Yes  Yes  
      
Constant 1.197 -0.128 1.665* -0.279 -3.450*** 
Log pseudo-likelihood -22,591.226 -27391.931 
Wald-chi squared 5,267.21 13173.92 
Observations 26,684  27,296  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Omitted categories are: “self employed” (occupational groups), “left” (political views), 
“easy access”.  
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Table 6. Country dummies in the pooled sample. 
 
 
COUNTRIES 
PRICE SATISFACTION QUALITY SATISFACTION 
Generalized ordered logit Generalized ordered logit 
1 2 1 2 3 
France -0.287 0.332 0.914* 0.845** 1.193*** 
Belgium 0.479** 0.376** 1.152*** 1.145*** 1.934*** 
Netherlands -0.643*** -0.643*** 0.055 0.050 0.626** 
Germany -0.187 -1.037*** 0.005 0.012 0.416 
Danemark 0.764*** 0.764*** 1.025*** 1.469*** 2.467*** 
Ireland 0.675 0.675 0.880* 1.276*** 2.472*** 
United Kingdom 0.761** 0.281 0.338 0.888*** 1.572*** 
Greece 2.667*** 1.670*** 2.302***   
Spain 1.446*** 1.054*** 1.640***   
Portugal 1.838*** 0.958** 1.699*** 1.562*** 0.810* 
Finland 2.812*** 0.894*** 1.420*** 1.932*** 2.094*** 
Sweden 1.600*** 0.366* 1.053*** 1.668*** 2.439*** 
Austria -0.638** 0.215 0.871** 1.145*** 2.195*** 
 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Italy is the omitted country.
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Table 7. Description of some variables. 
 Macroeconomic indicators 
Name Description Level Source 
Disposable income Net disposable income of households expressed in PPP NUTS II 
Eurostat 
Regional 
statistics 
Yearly change in 
disposable income 
Change in net disposable income of households 
compared with the previous year NUTS II 
Eurostat 
Regional 
statistics 
Population density Inhabitants per km² NUTS II 
Eurostat 
Regional 
statistics 
Unemployment Unemployment rate NUTS II 
Eurostat 
Regional 
statistics 
Suicides Suicide rate (deaths per 100.000 inhabitants) NUTS II 
Eurostat 
Regional 
statistics 
 Railways indicators 
Fares revenue/passenger-km expressed in PPP  Country 
World Bank’s 
Railways 
database 
Yearly change in fares Change in fares compared with the previous year Country 
World Bank’s 
Railways 
database 
Accidents Number of fatalities Country European Commission* 
Monopoly Number of providers of railway transport Country United Nations** 
Demand Passenger-km per capita  Country 
World Bank’s 
Railways 
database and 
Eurostat 
Railways/motorways Ratio between the length of railways and motorways NUTS II 
Eurostat 
Regional 
statistics 
    
 
  * Directorate-General for Energy and Transport 
    ** Annual Bulletin of Transport Statistics for Europe and North America 
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* 2000, 2002 and 2004 average values 
** 2004
Table 8. Some row data for the variables depicted in table 7. 
 Population density* 
Disposable 
income* 
Unemployment 
rate* Suicide rate* 
Railways: 
monopoly** 
Belgium 340.77 14.69 6.95 19.10 Yes 
France 97.40 14.69 9.26 17.60 Yes 
Netherlands 476.27 13.27 3.75 9.47 No 
Germany 230.77 15.82 8.87 13.33 Yes 
Italy 194.60 14.30 9.18 7.10 Yes 
Denmark 124.63 11.33 4.65 12.87 Yes 
Ireland 57.40 12.51 4.30 11.67 No 
United Kingdom 243.57 15.69 5.06 7.07 No 
Greece 84.07 11.46 10.40 3.20 No 
Spain 81.87 12.38 12.06 8.27 Yes 
Portugal 112.63 9.62 5.22 9.43 No 
Finland 17.10 10.75 9.17 21.27 No 
Sweden 21.77 12.34 5.86 12.90 Yes 
Austria 98.07 15.78 4.14 18.70 No 
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Appendix 2. 
Evidence presented in the first part of this work showed how perceived satisfaction 
differs between different groups of individuals. As we have seen, for example, elderly 
tend to be more satisfied than young people, women are less likely to be satisfied than 
men, center voters seem to appreciate rail transport more than others, etc.  
 
The problem underlying this approach is that agents’ satisfaction is based on both 
individual characteristics and on their travel experience. The former have been included 
in our models, whilst as a substitute for the latter we used some proxies as the level of 
fares, the ratio between railways and motorways, etc. This procedure allows to compare 
patterns of satisfaction among different countries but could lead to misleading results. 
 
The evidence concerning the level of fares, for example, is somehow contradictory. As 
we mentioned in the previous section, a problem of endogeneity could affect our 
estimations, since the level of prices depends on a lot of unobserved factors which are 
supposedly to be included in our residuals. Moreover, each respondent based his/her 
judgement on his/her own travel experience, i.e. on the price he/she paid, on the delay 
he/she suffered, etc. An average measure or these factors obviously misses to capture 
such effects.  
 
In order to avoid this problem we produce in this sub-section a new empirical 
application about consumers’ satisfaction. Basically, we replicate the analysis carried 
out in the previous section by using the results from a survey conducted in June and 
July 2008. A sample of 407 travellers has been asked to answer a questionnaire about 
their satisfaction with rail transport in terms of punctuality. They have been also 
required to reveal some individual characteristics such as age, income and education. 
 
The data. 
 
Data originate from the survey about the estimation of the Value of Travel Time (VOT) 
presented in the previous chapter. Even if the first goal of this survey consisted in the 
analysis of travellers’ preferences about time, we asked the respondents to state, on a 
scale from 1 to 10 their satisfaction with railway transport in terms of punctuality.  
Respondents have also been asked about some individual characteristics such as age, 
gender, income, level of education and use of the transportation mode (journeys per 
month), reason of the journey (work or leisure trips). A more detailed description of the 
questionnaire is available at the end of this section, jointly with some descriptive 
statistics about the results. 
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The empirical model. 
 
We analyse the connection between satisfaction and individual carachteristics from two 
different perspectives. 
 
In the first one, assumptions about utility are the same as in the previous section. An 
ordered logit model is estimated on perceived quality. For the second sample the 
dependent variable has been recoded in four categories, as in Eurobarometer surveys. 
Those who assigned to punctuality a score between 1 and 3 are in the first category. The 
second one includes those who answered 4 or 5, while the third and the fourth 
categories comprehend respectively respondents who stated a judgement equal to 6 or 7 
and equal or higher than 8. 
 
In the second case we analyse the problem using a Bayesian Network (BN). Some 
theoretical issues about BN are summarised in the previous chapter (paragraph 3). Since 
the dataset is the same we used in the previous section, we estimate the same network, 
still using the R library bnlearn (Scutari, 2010). 
 
Results. 
 
Compared with the previous part of this work, here we are analysing a different group 
of individuals. In the first case, through Eurobarometer data, we were observing 
different patterns of satisfaction among respondents which depended on individual 
characteristics (partly observed) and on agents’ travel experience (unobserved). Here, 
differences in perceived satisfaction still depends on individual characteristics, but this 
time all respondents shared the same travel experience, since they paid the same ticket, 
they suffered the same delay and they travelled on the same coach.   
 
In the first case, even the effect of individual characteristics on the probability of being 
more or less satisfied could be biased by the fact that we do not have any information 
about respondents’ travel experience. For example, recalling the results reported in table 
6 in the previous section, we could suppose elderly to be less whining compared with 
young people. But it could also be the case that young individuals, supposed to be less 
wealthy than older respondents, usually travel on second class coaches, while elderly 
prefer first class. In this case different patterns of satisfaction across age could be 
simply explained by the fact that young and old respondents are judging two different 
things. The homogeneity of travel experience allows, in the second sample, to check the 
pure relation between individual characteristics and satisfaction. 
 
Table 2 summarizes the results from the second sample. The first column shows the 
ordered logit estimates. The explanatory power of this model is very low. None of the 
individual characteristics is significant. A connection with satisfaction is found for other 
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two variables. In the survey, we asked the respondents if they have ever evaluated costs 
and benefits of other travel options (car, bus, etc.) before choosing the train. Those who 
answered positively, i.e. travellers who evaluated alternative options, tend to be less 
satisfied with the quality of the service in terms of punctuality. This relation could be 
explained by the assumption that those who carefully planned their trip and evaluated 
also other travel options pay more attention on delays. 
Another question referred to the attitude of respondents to attach a monetary value to 
their time. Since this survey has been designed in order to estimate passengers VOT, it 
is quite surprising to note that a large share of respondents (about 33 per cent, table 1) 
do not consider at all delays as an economic damage. However, it is reasonable the sign 
of the coefficient reported in table 2: those who consider delays an economic damage 
tend to be more severe in evaluating service quality. 
 
Since in the ordered logit model the parallel assumption is rejected, we estimated, as in 
the previous section, a generalised ordered logit, letting the coefficients of the 
troublesome variables free to vary across categories. The most significant effect is the 
one related to the gender, as females are more likely to be very unsatisfied with train 
punctuality than men. The relation between age and satisfaction is contradictory: more 
than on satisfaction, age of the respondents seems to have a link with the intensity of 
judgements.  
 
Figure 1 reports the estimated BN. As we can see the network presents some differences 
compared with the ordered logit model. Satisfaction is directly affected by the reason of 
the trip (WORK). The parameter table (table 3) for the node SATISFACTION lists the 
conditional probability for the four outcomes of satisfaction given the reason of the trip. 
The difference between the two groups (work and non-work travellers) concentrates at 
the extreme: those who travel for non-work reasons are more likely to define themselves 
as “very satisfied” and less likely to report a judgement of strong dissatisfaction. 
 
Even if the reason of the trip is the only variable which directly affects satisfaction, we 
cannot say the latter to be independent from other individual features such as age or 
gender. The structure of the network shows how the reason of the trip is influenced by 
the level of education which, in turn, is affected by both age and gender of the 
respondents. The same applies by the monetary value attached by each respondent to 
train delays (VALDELAY), since it is generated by the same family of arcs which lead 
to satisfaction 
 
Conclusions. 
 
The estimations focused on the second sample, in which all respondents experienced the 
same travel situation, does not provide strong evidence linking satisfaction and 
individual characteristics. This result could sounds like a contradiction compared with 
the findings analysed in the previous part of this analysis. However, we could ask 
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ourselves about the meaning of those findings. The evidence linking females to lower 
patterns of satisfaction is a strong result, confirmed by several contributions in the 
literature. The same applies for the result which links elderly to higher levels of 
satisfaction. However, what does this result mean? Why females should complain more 
than men? 
 
The results presented in this appendix gives some hints about these questions and enable 
us to make a conjecture which needs further research in order to be confirmed. The 
ordered logit model and the Bayesian Network produced two results which share some 
interesting points in common. The main message they give us is that satisfaction is still 
affected by age and gender, but in an indirect way. Keeping constant the travel 
experience of respondents, they have an influence on satisfaction through attitudes, 
behaviours and ways of thinking, such as the reason of the trip, the way of evaluating 
travel alternatives or the attention they pay to delays and to other features of the service. 
 
. 
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Table 1. Structure of the questionnaire and descriptive statistics. 
 Absolute 
number % 
Gender (FEMALE)  Male 239 58.72 
  Female 168 41.28 
Reason for the trip (WORK)    
  Work trip 191 46.93 
  Non work trip 216 53.07 
How many times in a month do you travel on this rail 
line? (FREQ) 
   
  Less than one 177 43.49 
  Between 1 and 3 158 38.82 
  Between 3 and 5 41 10.07 
  More than five 31 7.62 
Age (AGE)     
  Less than 30 99 24.32 
  Between 31 and 45 150 36.86 
  Between 46 an 60 109 26.78 
  Over 60 49 12.04 
Education level (EDUC)      
  Elementary school 1 0.25 
  Junior high school 27 6.63 
  Senior high school 170 41.77 
  University 209 51.35 
Have you ever evaluated costs and benefits of other 
travel options (car, bus, etc.) for the trip between Turin 
and Milan? (ALTER) 
   
  Yes 177 43.49 
  No 230 56.51 
Why did you choose the railway? (REASON)    
  It is cheaper compared with other options 93 22.85 
  It is faster compared with other options 17 4.18 
  It is safer compared with other options 49 12.04 
  I do not like to travel by car 52 12.78 
  I do not have a car 71 17.44 
  I like to travel by train / it is more 
comfortable compared with other options 
125 30.71 
Net yearly income (INC)    
  Less than 5.000 47 11.55 
  Between 5.000 and 10.000 46 11.30 
  Between 10.000 and 15.000 57 14.00 
  Between 15.000 and 20.000 71 17.44 
  Between 20.000 and 25.000 63 15.48 
  Between 25.000 and 30.000 44 10.81 
  Between 30.000 and 40.000 38 9.34 
  Between 40.000 and 50.000 14 3.44 
  Between 50.000 and 70.000 17 4.18 
  More than 70.000 10 2.46 
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 Absolute 
number % 
How do you judge the quality of the service in terms of 
punctuality? (SATISFACTION) 
   
  1 (very bad) 4 0.98 
  2 20 4.91 
  3 33 8.11 
  4 33 8.11 
  5 47 11.55 
  6 77 18.92 
  7 84 20.64 
  8 81 19.90 
  9 16 3.93 
  10 (excellent) 12 2.95 
Do you consider train delays as an economic damage?    
(VALDELAY)  1 (severe damage) 2 0.49 
  2 21 5.16 
  3 43 10.57 
  4 20 4.91 
  5 42 10.32 
  6 46 11.30 
  7 27 6.63 
  8 33 8.11 
  9 39 9.58 
  10 (not at all) 134 32.92 
     
Have you ever tried to evaluate the damage in monetary 
terms? 
   
  Yes   
  No   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 103
Table 2. Satisfaction with railway quality on the train between Turin and Milan.  
Ordered logit results (coefficients). 
 
 
VARIABLES Ordered logit Generalized ordered logit  1 2 3 
     
Age 0.006 -0.026** -0.008 0.025*** 
Female -0.313 -0.854*** -0.395* -0.065 
Education -0.076 -0.071   
Income 0.006 0.015   
Work trip -0.322 -0.335   
Frequency -0.092 -0.096   
Evaluation of travel 
alternatives (yes) -0.403** -0.401**   
Reason of the travel choice     
Train  is cheaper -0.110 -0.063   
Train is faster -0.099 -0.100   
Train is safer 0.471 0.455   
I do not like to travel by car 0.088 1.247** 0.250 -0.219 
I do not have a car 0.063 0.019   
Economic value of delays 0.100*** 0.101***   
     
Cut point (1) -1.765**    
Cut point (2) -0.567    
Cut point (3) 1.237    
Constant  3.233*** 
Log-likelihood -517.164 -501.857 
Chi-squared (Wald-chi 
squared) 35.89 63.28 
Observations 407 407 
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Figure 1. Bayesian Network. 
AGEFEMALE
EDUC
WORK
FREQ ALTER VALDELAY
REASON
LOGCONSSATISFACTION
INC
 
Table 3. Parameters of node SATISFACTION. Conditional probability table. 
 
 
Satisfaction Work trips Non-work trips 
Very satisfied 0.194 0.333 
Fairly satisfied 0.408 0.384 
Fairly unsatisfied 0.238 0.164 
Very unsatisfied 0.162 0.120 
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Concluding remarks. 
 
This work tried to analyse the issue of reliability in SP methods. Since SP studies and 
surveys are largely exploited in project evaluations and often use as guidelines for 
policy decisions, their reliability constitutes a relevant topic. 
 
The first part of this work has been devoted to the discussion about the concept of 
reliability, pointing out how the economic literature deals with this issue and underlying 
some problematic aspects connected to the analysis of survey data.  
 
We identified two main categories of survey. The first one includes WTP and WTA 
estimations, where people are required to simulate their own market behaviour in 
fictitious scenarios designed by the researcher. The second family involves those studies 
in which respondents are asked to reveal their attitudes and perceptions. The concept of 
reliability has been defined based on this distinction. 
 
The second and the third section start from the definitions suggested in the first chapter 
and try to check SP reliability in two empirical studies. 
 
The first one has been specifically carried out for this research. A sample of 407 train 
travellers has been asked to simulate their behaviour in several, hypothetical travel 
scenarios. The goal of this survey consisted in evaluating the WTP for travel time and 
both the structure of the questionnaire and the method used for the data collection 
reflect the ones usually used in this kind of analysis. Study’s design allowed to define 
reliability in a less restrictive form compared with previous literature. Moreover, this 
formulation seems to fit better consumers’ behaviour than the one applied in other 
works. 
 
Results show how a significant share of respondents (about 25 per cent) was not able to 
properly report their preferences. WTP estimations demonstrate how the inclusion or 
the exclusion from the sample of unreliable choices produces significant implications 
for the exploitation of these data in policy evaluations. 
 
A few contributions focused on this specific issue, also because the structure of the 
questionnaires usually allow for very restrictive logical test. As a consequence, the large 
share of inconsistent cases induces to doubt about the formulation of the test rather than 
about individuals’ rationality. For this reason further research is needed, in order to fully 
understand how human limitations affect the correct estimations of WTP and WTA. 
 
The second empirical work deals with two surveys of the second kind. Here respondents 
have not been asked to replicate their behaviour, but to express a judgement about their 
satisfaction with railway transport. The two surveys used in this section are somehow 
complementary. The first one is a collection of three Eurobarometer Issues. In this case 
 110
we have a large amount of information about respondents’ characteristics, whilst we do 
not know many things about their travel behaviour. The second survey is, again, the 
study presented in the previous chapter. This time we know that all respondents shared 
the same travel experience (i.e. they paid the same fare, travelled on the same coaches, 
etc.), but we have less information about their individual features. 
 
The joint analysis of these two datasets provides interesting results.  
 
Through Eurbarometer data we saw how individual characteristics affect satisfaction 
even if we include in the model some control variables for objective quality. The 
evidence confirms the findings of previous literature on the subject. However, we could 
ask ourselves about the real meaning of these findings. Why females should be more 
satisfied than males? Why elderly should complaint less than young people? How 
gender and age affect satisfaction? 
 
We have two possible explanations in order to answer these questions. The first one is 
to assume a sort of anthropological law which directly links individual characteristics 
with perceptions. The second, more realistic, one is to assume that individual 
characteristics affect perceptions indirectly, through attitudes, behaviours and ways of 
thinking which are not randomly distributed in the population but are, with a certain 
degree, group-specific.  
 
Evidence form the second sample seems to confirm his conjecture. Age and gender still 
matter in defining patterns of satisfaction, but their influence affects perceptions through 
travel attitudes, such as the reason of the trip, the way of evaluating travel alternatives 
or the attention they pay to delays and to other features of the service. 
 
Probably this conjecture merits further attention, since it would shed some light on the 
determinants of consumers’ satisfaction and, consequently, on the reliability and proper 
interpretation of surveys’ results. 
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